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Sport has the power to change the world.  It has the 
power to inspire.  It has the power to unite people in 
a way that little else has. 
—Nelson Mandela1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout modern history, professional and amateur athletics 
have provided cultures an important platform for various civil 
rights movements and a vehicle for achieving social equality.  
Several examples—from Jackie Robinson’s shattering of Major 
League Baseball’s (“MLB”) color barrier in 1947,2 to female Billie 
Jean King’s 1973 victory over Men’s Wimbledon champion Bobby 
Riggs,3 to the racially integrated South African national rugby 
team’s post-apartheid World Cup victory in 19954—demonstrate 
how sports can help transform cultures and eradicate many 
different types of social discrimination. 
Contrary to the days of Jackie Robinson, today most of 
Western society is no longer flooded with formal rules and policies 
that promote discrimination.5  Nevertheless, while formalized and 
overt discrimination has been successfully combated, the effects of 
past discrimination and the persistence of less obvious forms of 
discrimination are still evident in many spheres of Western 
 
 1 Quoted in Rob Hughes, In Host’s Success, Change Triumphs, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/sports/soccer/12iht-wcsoccer.html?Pagewant 
ed=all. 
 2 See Joanna Shepherd Bailey & George B. Shepherd, Baseball’s Accidental Racism: 
The Draft, African-American Players, and the Law, 44 CONN. L. REV. 197, 199 (2011).  
 3 See Miriam A. Cherry, Exercising the Right to Public Accommodations: The Debate 
Over Single-Sex Health Clubs, 52 ME. L. REV. 97, 113 (2000). 
 4 See Mark Givesser, South Africa’s World Cup Moment, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/08/opinion/08iht-edgevisser.html? pagewanted=all.  
 5 See Timothy Davis, The Myth of the Superspade: The Persistence of Racism in 
Collegiate Athletics, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615, 641 (1995) [hereinafter Davis, The Myth 
of the Superspade]; see also Cameron Hosts Anti-Racism Summit, ESPN STAR (Feb. 22, 
2012), http://www.espnstar.com/football/news/detail/item757418/Cameron-hosts-anti-
racism-summit.  
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society.6  This becomes apparent when analyzing management 
position demographics within the United States workforce.  As of 
the beginning of 2011, 87.6% of United States management 
occupations were held by white people.7  Conversely, of these 
same types of occupations, black or African-American people and 
Hispanic or Latino people held only 6.4% and 7.6%, respectively.8  
These numbers become even more alarming when the 
demographic analysis is broken down into chief executive and 
general manager positions.9 
A similar problem is apparent in the professional sporting 
world, even though professional sports leagues are now often 
thought to be a “paragon of an integrated society.”10  Despite the 
fact that on the playing field many professional sports leagues are 
racially and ethnically diverse, professional sports leagues’ 
management composition tells a different story.  For example, 
there are thirty teams in MLB and each team has twenty-five 
players on its roster.11  At the start of the 2011 MLB season, the 
total number of minority players12 in MLB was 38.3%.13  The 
opening day rosters of the combined thirty MLB teams were 
61.5% White, 27% Latino, 8.5% African-American, 2.1% Asian, 
 
 6 See Davis, The Myth of the Superspade, supra note 5, at 642.  
 7 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, LABOR FORCE 
CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE AND ETHNICITY, 2010 16 (2011), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsrace2010.pdf.  
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. (calculating that as of August 2011, U.S. chief executives were 93% White, 2.8% 
Black, and 4.8% Latino and that U.S. general and operations managers were 89.2% 
White, 5.8% Black, and 5.9% Latino). 
 10 Brian W. Collins, Tackling Unconscious Bias in Hiring Practices: The Plight of the 
Rooney Rule, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 873 (2007).  
 11 Patrick S. Baldwin, Note, Keeping Them Down on the Farm: The Possibility of a 
Class Action by Former Minor League Baseball Players Against Major League Baseball 
for Allowing Steroid Abuse, 43 GA. L. REV. 1195, 1199 n.10 (2010).  
 12 In the context of this Note, the phrase “minority” means those that are of a race 
other than Caucasian. 
 13 RICHARD LAPCHICK ET AL., THE INSTITUTE FOR DIVERSITY AND ETHNICS IN SPORTS, 
THE 2011 RACIAL AND GENDER REPORT CARD: MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 1, 3 (2011), 
available at http://tidesport.org/RGRC/2011/2011_MLB_RGRC_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter 
LAPCHICK ET AL., MLB RACIAL AND GENDER REPORT CARD].  
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0.4% Native American or Native Alaskan, and 0.3% Native 
Hawaiian or Pacific Islander.14 
During this same time period, however, of the staff in MLB’s 
Central Office, only 22.5% of the employees were minorities at the 
director and managerial level.15  Additionally, at the start of the 
2011 MLB season “there was no person of color as either CEO or 
team President of an MLB team” and there were just four minority 
general managers.16  Finally, while minorities occupy a combined 
42% of the coaching positions in Major and Minor League 
Baseball, of the thirty MLB teams only six had minority head 
coaches at the start of the 2011 season.17 
This phenomenon is not limited to the United States and its 
professional sports leagues, but can also be seen in Great Britain.  
The two best professional soccer leagues in Great Britain are 
England’s Premier League and England’s Football League.18  
There are ninety-two clubs in the two leagues combined.19  Most of 
the clubs have players of all different races and ethnicities and the 
two leagues host several anti-discrimination events each year.20  In 
fact, as of the beginning of 2007 approximately a quarter of all 
“league club”21 players were black.22  Nevertheless, during this 
 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See id. at 4. 
 17 Id.  Notwithstanding these disparities, Dr. Richard Lapchick’s 2011 report 
appropriately gave the MLB a Grade A for its current racial diversity in the workplace 
given the fact that these employment statistics marked significant relative improvement 
in MLB’s overall past hiring practices and their correlation with the rest of the American 
workforce. Id. at 1.  
 18 See Stephen F. Ross & Stefan Szymanski, Open Competition in League Sports, 2002 
WIS. L. REV. 625, 636 (2002). 
 19 See Lucy Tobin, Why Aren’t There More Black Football Managers?, GUARDIAN 
(Mar. 28, 2011, 10:45 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2011/ mar/28/black-
football-managers-institutional-racism.   The Premier League contains twenty clubs and 
is the best professional English soccer league. See id.  The Football League is divided 
into three differently ranked divisions with twenty-four clubs in each division. See id.  In 
order of highest divisional ranking they are as follows: The Champions Leagues; League 
One; and League Two. See id.   
 20 See id.   
 21 The ninety-two clubs in the Premier League and Football League are commonly 
referred to collectively as the “league clubs.” Id. 
 22 Id. 
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same time period, “only two out of 92 league clubs had black 
managers.”23 
Not blind to their own employment statistics and the public 
relations dilemma that information like this causes, several 
professional sports leagues in both the United States and Great 
Britain have created marketing and press-generating initiatives 
aimed at promoting human equality both on and off the field.24  
Yet relatively few United States or British professional sports 
leagues have implemented substantive league rules or mandates to 
address the racial and ethnic disparity that exists in the hiring of 
league management and head coaches.25  To be sure, the 
effectiveness and legality of this approach to creating employment 
equality has been widely debated by scholars and industry leaders 
on both sides of the Atlantic.26  However, when the National 
Football League (“NFL”) implemented the “Rooney Rule,” it 
demonstrated the tremendously positive influence that league 
employment mandates can have on establishing racial equality in 
the hiring of head coaches and executives in professional sports.27 
Implemented by the NFL in 2002, the Rooney Rule requires 
that all of the NFL’s thirty-two teams interview at least one racial 
minority candidate for head coaching and senior football 
 
 23 Id.  In English soccer, a manager is generally considered equivalent to an NFL head 
coach.  
 24 See, e.g., id.; RICHARD LAPCHICK ET AL., THE INSTITUTE FOR DIVERSITY AND ETHNICS 
IN SPORTS, THE 2011 RACIAL AND GENDER REPORT CARD: NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 5 
(2011), available at http://tidesport.org/RGRC/2011/RGRC_NFL_2011_ FINAL.pdf 
[hereinafter LAPCHICK ET AL., NFL RACIAL AND GENDER REPORT CARD]; LAPCHICK ET 
AL., MLB RACIAL AND GENDER REPORT CARD, supra note 13, at 2.  
 25 See Leon Mann, Adopting the Rooney Rule in English Football, BBC SPORTS (Sept. 
11, 2011, 2:43 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/14856861; DOUGLAS C. 
PROXMIRE, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW AND POLICY, COACHING DIVERSITY: THE 
ROONEY RULE, ITS APPLICATION AND IDEAS FOR EXPANSION 7–8 (2008).  
 26 See, e.g., Collins, supra note 10, at 887 (“[S]ince the Rooney Rule’s design is 
relatively unprecedented it is important to explore whether or not it is even legal. . . .”); 
Hannah Gordon, The Robinson Rule: Models for Addressing Race Discrimination in the 
Hiring of NCAA Head Football Coaches, 15 SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 2–17 (2008) (discussing 
the justification for the Rooney Rule under a legal, regulatory, and non-legal basis); 
Mann, supra note 25.  
 27 See N. Jeremi Duru, The Fritz Pollard Alliance, The Rooney Rule, and The Quest to 
“Level the Playing Field” in the National Football League, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 
179, 197 (2008) [hereinafter Duru, The Fritz Pollard Alliance].  
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operations positions before filling a vacancy in such a position.28  
Failure to comply with the rule results in a stiff monetary penalty.29  
Since the rule’s implementation, the number of racial minority 
NFL head coaches has quadrupled from just two in 2002 to an all-
time high of eight in 2011.30  Importantly, the rule has affected not 
only head coach but also team executive hiring.  Since the Rooney 
Rule’s introduction, the number of general managers who belong 
to a racial minority has gone from one to five.31 
Despite the success of the Rooney Rule in the NFL and both 
domestic and international calls for the leadership of English 
professional soccer to take similar action, so far no comparable 
rule has been implemented.32  This paper advocates for the two 
best British professional soccer leagues, the Premier League and 
the Football League, to adopt a policy akin to the NFL’s Rooney 
Rule and, unlike other past commentaries on this topic, also 
proposes a detailed version of the rule that could effectively 
operate within both existing British employment discrimination 
law and English professional soccer’s business model.  As it was in 
the NFL’s case, implementation of such a rule would likely be a 
significant step toward achieving racial equality in English 
professional soccer league managerial and executive employment 
opportunities. 
Part I of this Note will discuss the history of race relations in 
the NFL, focusing on the Rooney Rule’s origins.  It will then 
summarize the substantive United States law that pertains to the 
Rooney Rule and explain how the Rooney Rule fits within the 
greater legal framework of United States employment 
discrimination law.  This section concludes by discussing the 
Rooney Rule’s effectiveness, highlighting the ongoing debate over 
the necessity of the Rooney Rule’s continued use in the United 
 
 28 See id. at 189.  The Rooney Rule was extended to cover senior football operations 
positions in 2009. See NFL Expands “Rooney Rule” From Coaches to Senior Posts, CBS 
SPORTS (Jan.15, 2009), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/story/ 11859077/rss.  
 29 See PROXMIRE, supra note 25, at 4–5. 
 30 See LAPCHICK ET AL., NFL RACIAL AND GENDER REPORT CARD, supra note 24, at 8.  
As of September 2011, there were seven African-American NFL head coaches and one 
Latino NFL head coach. Id. 
 31 See id. at 10. 
 32 See Mann, supra note 25. 
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States.  Part II of this Note will then analyze the current racial 
inequality in English professional soccer’s managerial and 
executive ranks, underscoring its similarities to the pre-Rooney 
Rule NFL.  This section also highlights how this problem fits 
within the greater British employment discrimination law context.  
The discussion will then turn towards the ongoing British debate 
regarding the potential utilization of the Rooney Rule in English 
professional soccer.  Last, Part III argues for English professional 
soccer’s adoption of a version of the Rooney Rule.  This proposal 
takes into account the United Kingdom’s relevant legal landscape, 
English professional soccer’s league and organizational structure, 
and various social attitudes toward the Rooney Rule and 
affirmative action. 
I. INSIDE THE NFL RACE RELATIONS HUDDLE 
Professional sports are often characterized as a “microcosm of 
society.”33  To a large extent this is true in that “individual 
attitudes, values, and beliefs in the broader society become an 
integral part of sporting practices.”34  Consequently, professional 
sports regularly mimic societal norms with respect to human 
interaction.  A short history of race relations in the NFL and an 
account of the Rooney Rule’s origins will both serve to illustrate 
this point. 
A. Integration on the NFL Playing Field 
Much like the United States’ race relations history, the history 
of race relations within the NFL is a tumultuous one.  In 1919, the 
Akron Pros—a football team in the American Professional 
Football Association (“APFA”)—were led by a black running 
back, Fritz Pollard.35  Pollard was a standout player in the APFA, 
which renamed itself the NFL in 1922.36  In 1921, Pollard also 
 
 33  Timothy Davis, Race and Sports in America: A Historical Overview, 7 VA. SPORTS 
& ENT. L.J. 291, 291 (2008) [hereinafter Davis, Race and Sports in America].  
 34 Id. at 291–92. 
 35 See Duru, The Fritz Pollard Alliance, supra note 27, at 181.  
 36 See United States Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1343 
(2d Cir. 1988) (referencing the APFA’s renaming of itself). 
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took over the head coaching duties of the Akron Pros, becoming 
the league’s first black head coach.37  However, throughout much 
of the 1920s, African-Americans continued to participate in NFL 
football solely as players.38 
Unfortunately, as the professional game grew in popularity 
throughout “White America,” the number of African-Americans 
playing in the NFL shrank to zero in 1933.39  The following year, 
the NFL officially banned all African-Americans from the 
league.40  It is hard to pinpoint any reason other than racism that 
the NFL decided to “bleach itself white.”41  It is worth noting, 
however, that in an effort to formalize the league, the NFL 
restructured itself into two divisions of five teams each and added 
a season-ending title game in 1933.42  This ultimately led to more 
media attention and presumably a concern that a prevalence of 
African-American athletes would turn off white patrons.43 
The ban on people of color in the NFL lasted twelve years, 
finally ending in 1946 when the Los Angeles Rams signed UCLA 
players Kenny Washington and Woody Strode to NFL contracts.44  
Unsurprisingly, this corresponds directly with the end of World 
War II, a time in which a sizable portion of America was 
 
 37 Duru, The Fritz Pollard Alliance, supra note 27, at 181.  
 38 See Bram A. Maravent, Is the Rooney Rule Affirmative Action? Analyzing the NFL’s 
Mandate to its Clubs Regarding Coaching and Front Office Hires, 13 SPORTS LAW. J. 
233, 236 (2006) (Fritz Pollard was the only African-American to be a head coach in the 
NFL until 1989). 
 39  Charles Kenyatta Ross, OUTSIDE THE LINES: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE 
INTEGRATION OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 46–47 (New York University Press, 
1999) (noting how professional football saw a significant rise in fan support during the 
1920’s and how the NFL subsequently reorganized in 1933, where upon all black players 
were removed from the league). 
 40 See N. Jeremi Duru, Fielding a Team for the Fans: The Societal Consequences and 
Title VII Implications of Race-Considered Roster Construction in Professional Sport, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 375, 383 (2006) [hereinafter Duru, Fielding a Team for the Fans]. 
 41 Alexander Wolff, The NFL’s Jackie Robinson, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 12, 
2009), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1161017/1/ 
index.htm. 
 42 See id. 
 43 See id. 
 44 See Duru, Fielding a Team for the Fans, supra note 40, at 383. 
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rethinking race and gender relations given the significant 
contributions that minorities made to the United States war effort.45 
As the United States Civil Rights Movement took hold across 
the country, by 1963 every NFL roster included at least one 
African-American player.46  By 1970, African-Americans made up 
about 30% of the NFL’s players.47  Since then, this number has 
consistently risen, to the point where today African-Americans 
make up 67% of the NFL’s players and the NFL is annually 
recognized as having achieved exemplar racial diversity on the 
playing field.48 
Still, while the overall racial diversity of the NFL has 
increased, a troubling trend developed among the NFL’s players of 
color.  The positions Kenny Washington and Woody Strode 
played, wide receiver and running back, are “the paradigmatic 
football ‘workhorse positions’—positions commonly viewed as 
demanding more physical prowess than intellectual ability.”49  As 
African-Americans continued to enter the NFL from 1946 onward, 
they disproportionately played these types of positions.50  
Conversely, the quarterback position, often viewed as a position 
that requires high intelligence, remained essentially an all-white 
position for quite some time.51 
Today, things have finally improved.  This has been due in 
large part to the increased rate at which racial minorities are 
playing the quarterback position at the collegiate level and the 
success they have had there.52  For example, since 2000, three 
 
 45 See Douglas S. Massey, The Past and Future of American Civil Rights, 140 
DAEDALUS 37, 41–42 (2011). 
 46 Ross, supra note 39, at 156.  
 47 Id. at 157 
 48 See LAPCHICK ET AL., NFL RACIAL AND GENDER REPORT CARD, supra note 24, at 3. 
 49 Duru, The Fritz Pollard Alliance, supra note 27 at 182. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Duru, The Fritz Pollard Alliance, supra note 27, at 182. 
 52 See Darren Everson & Ben Cohen, The Year of the Black Quarterback, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 30, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020352540457 
6049970496106128.html.  
C06_CORAPI (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2013  2:34 PM 
2012] THE NFL’S ROONEY RULE 351 
African-American quarterbacks have won the Heisman Trophy,53 
helping to dispel any bigoted notions that minorities are not 
“intelligent” enough to play the quarterback position.54  Moreover, 
since 1992, thirteen minority quarterbacks have been selected in 
the first round of the NFL draft, while several others were picked 
in the second and third rounds.55  The effect of this has been that as 
of the start of the 2012 NFL season, minority individuals held six 
of the NFL’s starting quarterback positions (or approximately 20% 
of the NFL’s starting quarterback positions).56 
B. Race Discrimination in NFL Head Coach and Management 
Hiring 
While NFL minority players undoubtedly faced barriers to 
employment equality, the barriers facing minority NFL coaches 
and executives were far more onerous, even during times in which 
race relations improved in the United States.57  As Temple 
University Law School Professor N. Jeremi Duru explains: 
The presumption of intellectual inferiority but 
physical superiority obviously hampers the black 
candidate seeking a quarterback position, for which 
both physical and intellectual ability are deemed 
necessary.  The presumption, however, completely 
handicaps the black candidate pursuing a coaching 
 
 53 The Heisman Trophy is awarded each year to the best overall college football player 
from the past season. See Brief History of the Heisman Memorial Trophy, HEISMAN 
TROPHY, http://www.heisman.com/history/trophy_history.php (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). 
 54 See Heisman Winners, HEISMAN TROPHY, http://www.heisman.com/index.php/ 
heismanWinners#winners-year (last visited Mar 4, 2012) (Troy Smith, Cam Newton, and 
Robert Griffin III). 
 55 See NFL Draft History, NFL.COM, http://www.nfl.com/draft/history/fulldraft? 
type=position (Robert Griffin III (2012), Cam Newton (2011), Josh Freeman (2009), 
Mark Sanchez (2009), JaMarcus Russell (2007), Vince Young (2006), Jason Campbell 
(2005), Byron Leftwich (2003), Michael Vick (2001)); Peter Lawrence-Riddell, Ten 
Years of First-Round Quarterbacks, ESPN.COM, (Apr. 17, 2003), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfldraft/story?id=1539344 (demonstrating the black NFL first-
round draft picks from 1992–2001: Daunte Culpepper (1999), Akili Smith (1999), 
Donovan McNabb (1999), Steve McNair (1995)). 
 56 See, e.g., John Clayton, NFL Starting Quarterback Rankings, ESPN.COM (Aug. 23, 
2012), http://espn.go.com/nfl/preview12/story/_/id/8276502/nfl-quarterback-rankings-
john-clayton-reveals-2012-hierarchy-signal-callers-part-1.  
 57 See Duru, The Fritz Pollard Alliance, supra note 27, at 184. 
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position, a position for which physical ability is 
irrelevant and intellectual ability—the candidate’s 
presumed weakness—is paramount. . . . Indeed, 
between 1946, when Strode and Washington re-
integrated the NFL, and the beginning of the 1989 
season, every head coach in the NFL was white.58 
This is in stark contrast to the sharp increase in the number of 
players of color that entered the league during this same time 
period which, as discussed above, went “from zero to making up 
67 percent” of the total number of players in the NFL.59 
 Finally, in 1989 the Los Angeles Raiders broke this pattern 
and hired Art Shell, an African-American, to be the first minority 
head coach in the NFL since the 1946 re-integration.60  While Shell 
had a successful coaching career—perhaps most notably, he was 
awarded coach of the year in 1990—his accomplishments did little 
to improve the “plight of colored NFL coaches and 
management.”61  In fact, from 1986 through 2002, only five other 
minorities were hired as head coaches in the NFL.62 
C. The Rooney Rule: Its Origins 
Following the 2001 season, many began to question NFL 
teams’ hiring practices with respect to minority coaches.  It was 
anomalous that in a league where more than 60% of players were 
of color, only 6% of the head coaches were of color.63  Skeptical 
that such a discrepancy was coincidental, in 2002 civil rights 
attorneys Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr. and Cyrus Mehri hired 
University of Pennsylvania labor economist Dr. Janice Madden to 
analyze the performance of the five full-time black NFL head 
coaches from 1989 to 2001 and compare it to all the other white 
NFL head coaches that had coached during this same time 
 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 185. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id.  
 62 See id. at 186 (citing Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr. & Cyrus Mehri, BLACK COACHES IN 
THE NFL: SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE, INFERIOR OPPORTUNITIES 1, at ii (2002) [hereinafter 
Cochran & Mehri Report]. 
 63 See id.  Only two out of the thirty-two NFL teams had head coaches of color to start 
the 2002 NFL season. Id. 
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period.64  The results were conclusive and confirmed Cochran’s 
and Mehri’s suspicions.  Dr. Madden’s research indicated that by 
any statistical measure, black head coaches as a group 
outperformed their white counterparts and yet individually each 
still had to perform better than white coaches in order to obtain and 
retain a job as a head coach in the NFL.65 
As a result of Dr. Madden’s research, Cochran and Mehri went 
on to promulgate what would be the seminal report in convincing 
the NFL that it needed to affirmatively do something to address the 
racial inequality that inundated the head coach hiring practices of 
NFL teams.66  The report was prepared by Mehri’s law firm, Mehri 
& Skalet, and it detailed the inequitable hiring opportunities that 
existed for black coaches despite, as Dr. Madden’s research clearly 
showed, their superior coaching performance compared to white 
head coaches.67 
Importantly, at no point in the report did Cochran and Mehri 
claim that minority coaches were inherently better at coaching than 
white coaches.68  Rather, they concluded that since black NFL 
coaches had to work so much harder than white NFL coaches just 
to be considered for NFL head coaching vacancies, the black 
coaches were better prepared to actually be head coaches once they 
were finally given the opportunity.69  The strong statistical 
evidence that black coaches were being held to higher employment 
 
 64 See id. 
 65 Id. Madden’s research found that “black [head] coaches averaged 1.1 more wins per 
season than white [head] coaches” and “led their teams to the playoffs 67% of the time.” 
Cochran & Mehri Report, supra note 62, at ii.  White coaches, on the other hand, only led 
their teams to the playoffs 39% of the time. Id.  Additionally, “black [head] coaches 
averaged 2.7 more wins than the white coaches in their first seasons.” Id.  Accordingly, 
black [head] coaches “were far more likely [in these seasons] to advance their teams to 
the playoffs than were white [head] coaches.” Duru, The Fritz Pollard Alliance, supra 
note 27, at 187.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, “[i]n their last seasons before 
being fired, black [head] coaches outperformed their white counterparts.  Black [head] 
coaches won an average of 1.3 more games in their terminal years than white [head] 
coaches, and while twenty percent (20%) of the black coaches who were fired led their 
teams to the playoffs in the year of their firing, only eight percent (8%) of white coaches 
did the same.” Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 66 See Cochran & Mehri Report, supra note 62. 
 67 See id. at i n.1, ii.   
 68 Duru, The Fritz Pollard Alliance, supra note 27, at 187. 
 69 Id. 
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standards than white coaches allowed Cochran and Mehri to 
persuasively demonstrate in their report that NFL teams were 
discriminatory in their hiring practices.70  Ultimately, faced with a 
credible report that demonstrated that coaches of color were having 
more success as NFL head coaches than white coaches, yet were 
receiving far fewer opportunities to become and remain head 
coaches, the NFL knew that it had to take action.71  Thus, 
following the report’s publication in September 2002 and the 
consequent threats of a lawsuit, the NFL promptly had to 
determine how to proceed so as to avoid protracted litigation and 
further embarrassment.72 
Chaired by Pittsburgh Steelers co-owner Daniel Rooney, the 
NFL put together a panel known as the Committee on Work Place 
Diversity (the “Committee”).73  The Committee was tasked with 
reviewing Cochran and Mehri’s report and determining the type of 
remedial action that the NFL should take in response to it.74  The 
Committee would then make a final recommendation to all of the 
NFL team owners, detailing how the NFL should proceed.75 
Importantly, Cochran’s and Mehri’s report advocated a 
proactive plan requiring NFL teams to conduct meaningful head 
coaching job interviews with racial minority coaching candidates.76  
The report expressed a belief that the racial bias occurring in NFL 
head coach hiring, “whether conscious or unconscious, was 
steering teams away from minority head coaching candidates” and 
that a rule mandating fair interviewing procedures was the best 
way to effectuate a substantial change.77  Thus, Cochran and Mehri 
argued that each NFL team seeking to fill a head coaching vacancy 
should be required to interview at least one racial minority 
candidate before making a final hiring decision.78  To best prevent 
sham interviews, the report also suggested that the interviewers 
 
 70 Id. at 187–88. 
 71 See Collins, supra note 10, at 886. 
 72 Id.   
 73 Id. 
 74 See Duru, The Fritz Pollard Alliance, supra note 27, at 188. 
 75 Id. at 189. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See id. 
 78 Id. 
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should be team officials that have primary decision making 
authority when it comes to hiring.79 
After a few months of deliberation, the Committee issued its 
recommendations to the rest of the NFL team owners, and in 
December 2002, the NFL announced its mandatory interview 
rule.80  In accordance with the findings of Cochran and Mehri’s 
report, the Committee’s final proposal did not require that NFL 
teams hire minority individuals to be head coaches.81  Rather, and 
most crucially, the Committee’s final proposal required that any 
NFL team seeking to hire a head coach must interview at least one 
racial minority applicant for the position.82  Any team that failed to 
do so would be held in violation of this mandate and subjected to 
penalties at the Commissioner’s discretion.83  The proposed rule 
was dubbed the “Rooney Rule” after the Committee’s chair, Daniel 
Rooney.84 
Shortly thereafter, the Committee’s proposal was approved by 
the NFL team owners and was to become binding on all NFL 
teams the following year.85  With that, the Rooney Rule was born. 
D. The Rooney Rule: Its Implementation and Impact 
Unfortunately, while the Rooney Rule was initially hailed as a 
victory for employment equality in the NFL, many industry 
insiders and scholars were convinced that this rule would do little 
more than serve as a facade for continued discriminatory hiring 
practices and sham interviewing.86  Indeed, as of 2003, when the 
Rooney Rule was first implemented, there were only two NFL 
head coaches of color in the league and few people were convinced 
that a team’s violation of the Rooney Rule would result in a 
penalty severe enough to influence hiring practices going 
 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id.  
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 188. 
 83 See, e.g., id. at 194 (noting that in 2003, the then commissioner of the NFL, Paul 
Tagliabue, responded to the violation of the Rooney rule by the Lions head coach, Marty 
Mornhinweg, by issuing a severe punishment instead of choosing inaction). 
 84 Id. at 189. 
 85 Id.  
 86 See id. at 190. 
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forward.87  This view, however, radically changed when the 
Detroit Lions fired their head coach Marty Mornhinweg in 2003 
and subsequently violated the Rooney Rule when conducting the 
search for his successor.88  The violation resulted in public ridicule 
and a hefty $200,000 league fine imposed directly on the Detroit 
Lions’ General Manager Matt Millen89—the first penalty ever 
issued against an NFL team under the Rooney Rule.90 
From 2001 through 2006, the number of NFL head coaches of 
color increased from two to seven, and since 2007 there have 
consistently been at least six racial minority head coaches in the 
NFL.91  Moreover, as of the start of the 2011 NFL season, 25% of 
all NFL head coaches were people of color.92  While this increase 
might not be purely attributable to the Rooney Rule’s 
implementation, the rule has undoubtedly played a key role in 
helping to improve diversity among the NFL head coaching 
ranks.93 
Importantly, the Rooney Rule’s success has also led to its 
expanded use in the NFL and to calls for its implementation in 
collegiate level sports.94  In 2009, NFL team owners voted to 
extend the Rooney Rule to cover senior front office vacancies.95  
Current NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell explained: 
The recommendation . . . recognizes that this 
process has worked well in the context of head 
coaches and that clubs have deservedly received 
considerable positive recognition for their efforts in 
this respect.  The more thorough the search, the 
 
 87 Id. at 193. 
 88 Id.  
 89 Id. at 194. 
 90 See id. at 193–94. 
 91 See LAPCHICK ET AL., NFL RACIAL AND GENDER REPORT CARD, supra note 24, at 8. 
 92 See id. 
 93 See Duru, The Fritz Pollard Alliance, supra note 27, at 197.   
 94 See id. (describing how the National Collegiate Athletic Association implemented a 
version of the Rooney Rule to help establish equal employment opportunities for 
minority football head coaching candidates at the collegiate level). 
 95 Carl Horowitz, The “Rooney Rule”: Pro Football’s Affirmative Action Deception, 
NAT’L LEGAL & POL’Y CENTER (July 17, 2009, 4:49 PM), http://nlpc.org/stories/ 
2009/07/17/rooney-rule-pro-footballs-affirmative-action-deception. 
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more likely clubs are to find the right candidates 
and to be able to groom future leaders from within 
their organizations.96 
The application of the Rooney Rule to front office executive 
vacancies has further helped facilitate employment equality in the 
NFL.  Notably, eight out of the last eleven Super Bowl teams have 
featured either a head coach or general manager of color.97  
Moreover, since the rule’s original implementation in 2003, the 
number of racial minority NFL general managers has increased 
from one to five.98 
E. The Legal X’s and O’s of the Rooney Rule in the United States 
To properly understand not only the Rooney Rule’s utility, but 
also the controversy surrounding it in the United States, it is 
necessary to engage in what scholar Vivian Grosswald Curran calls 
“cultural immersion.”99  By approaching the Rooney Rule from 
both a historical and legal perspective, it is much easier to 
understand the important role that the Rooney Rule plays in the 
NFL and, more broadly, in the United States workplace. 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act creates a statutory 
prohibition against employment discrimination and expands upon 
the civil rights protections offered by the United States 
Constitution’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.100  Critically, 
while the Constitution’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments only 
prohibit discrimination by public employers, Title VII extends this 
prohibition to discrimination by private employers.101 
 
 96 Id. 
 97 See LAPCHICK ET AL., NFL RACIAL AND GENDER REPORT CARD, supra note 24, at 3 
(identifying the head coaches or general managers of color of the last eleven Super Bowl 
teams as Tony Dungy, Lovie Smith, Mike Tomlin, Jim Caldwell, Jerry Reese and Rod 
Graves).  
 98 See Mann, supra note 25. 
 99 COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, COMPARATIVE LAW SERIES 49–50 (Vivian 
Grosswald Curran ed., 2002). 
 100 See George Rutherglen, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF EQUALITY 
IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 6 (Foundation Press, 3d ed. 2010). 
 101 See id. 
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More specifically, “Title VII of the Act prohibits employer 
discrimination against employees and potential employees.”102  
Prohibited types of discrimination include discrimination on the: 
basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin 
“with respect to . . . compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment . . . .” 
Moreover, [under Title VII] an employer may not 
use race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in a 
way that adversely affects an employee’s status or 
deprives an employee or potential employee of an 
employment opportunity.  Thus, the purpose of 
Title VII is to “remove . . . artificial, arbitrary, and 
unnecessary barriers to employment when the 
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the 
basis of racial or other impermissible 
classification.”103 
Title VII prohibits both disparate treatment and disparate 
impact discrimination.104  Disparate treatment occurs when an 
employer intentionally treats either an individual employee or class 
of employees “less favorably than others because of their race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”105  In all cases, the plaintiff 
must show discriminatory motive, although motive can be inferred 
from the situation.106 
For an individual claim of disparate treatment to be successful 
under Title VII, the plaintiff must prove that he was treated 
differently by the employer because of his status as one of the Title 
VII protected categories.107  For a claim of systemic disparate 
treatment to be successful, the plaintiff must prove that he was 
 
 102 See Roy S. Hochbaum, “And It Only Took Them 307 Years”: Ruminations on Legal 
and Non-Legal Approaches to Diversifying Head Coaching in College Football, 17 VILL. 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 161, 186–87 (2010). 
 103 Id. at 187 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). 
 104 See Hannah Arterian Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and 
Disparate Treatment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1954 After Beazer and 
Burdine, 23 B.C. L. REV. 419, 419 (1982). 
 105 Hochbaum, supra note 102, at 187. 
 106 Id. at 187–88. 
 107 Id. at 188. 
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among a class of workers that were treated differently from another 
class based on a Title VII protected status.108 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the United States 
Supreme Court articulated the test for making a successful 
individual disparate treatment claim against an employer under 
Title VII.109  The Court explained that where individuals allege 
adverse employment action “because of” their membership in a 
Title VII protected group, the test to be applied is a burden-shifting 
analysis.110  Under this test the plaintiff must make a prima facie 
showing of discrimination.111  To make this prima facie case the 
plaintiff must show: 1) that he was a member of the Title VII 
protected group; 2) that the plaintiff applied for and qualified for 
the job; 3) that despite qualification, he was rejected; 4) that after 
rejection the position remained open and the employer continued 
to seek applicants with those same qualifications; and 5) based on 
an amendment to Title VII in the 1991 Civil Rights Act which 
occurred after the McDonnell Douglas case, that prohibited 
discrimination was a “motivating factor.”112 
If the plaintiff can make out a prima facie showing, the burden 
then shifts to the defendant employer to present evidence that the 
alleged discrimination had a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason.”113  If it can do this, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff 
to show that the defendant’s proffered reason is simply a pretext 
for intentional discrimination based on a Title VII protected 
class.114  If the defendant employer does not offer a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for rejecting the plaintiff, the trier of fact 
may infer that the defendant employer unlawfully discriminated 
against the plaintiff.115 
 
 108 Id. 
 109 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 110 Id. at 801–02. 
 111 Id. at 802. 
 112 See id.; see also Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 
1071 (1991). 
 113 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.  
 114 Id. at 804. 
 115 See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). 
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As previously stated, in addition to plaintiff claims based on an 
individual disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff may also assert a 
valid claim under Title VII based on a systemic disparate treatment 
theory.116  If an employer maintains a policy that requires it to treat 
employees of a certain Title VII protected class differently than 
others, a systemic disparate treatment claim can be established by 
an employee if he is a member of that protected class.117  Under 
this disparate treatment theory, a burden shifting analysis is still 
used.118 
In a systemic disparate treatment case, the plaintiff still must 
make out a prima facie case of employment discrimination to shift 
the burden to the employer.119  However, the plaintiffs in these 
cases can use statistics to replace or bolster anecdotal evidence of 
the employer’s discrimination.120  If there is evidence of a pattern 
of exclusion or disparity in the composition of the employer’s 
workforce as compared to the relevant labor market, prohibited 
employment discrimination can be inferred.121  As is the case in 
individual disparate treatment claims, should the plaintiff be able 
to make out a prima facie discrimination case, the burden will shift 
to the employer to proffer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason 
for the alleged employment discrimination.122  If statistics were 
relied on by the plaintiff, however, in making its rebuttal the 
defendant employer can try to demonstrate that: 1) the wrong 
choice of relevant labor market was used for statistical 
comparison; 2) the wrong choice of individuals for statistical 
comparison were used; 3) the disparity is not sufficiently 
statistically significant; or 4) the disparity was caused by neutral 
 
 116 See Rutherglen, supra note 100, at 58–60. 
 117 See Hochbaum, supra note 102 at 188. 
 118 Id. (discussing the burden shifting analysis created for disparate treatment cases in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). 
 119 See id. 
 120 Id. at 190. 
 121 See Information on Impact 41 C.F.R. § 60–3.4 (2012). 
 122 See Rutherglen, supra note 100, at 71. 
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factors.123  In the absence of a meritorious defense rebuttal, 
employment discrimination will likely be inferred.124 
Finally, in addition to a disparate treatment theory, an 
employee may also assert a valid Title VII claim based on a 
disparate impact theory.125  “Disparate impact ‘involve[s] 
employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of 
different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group 
than another.’”126  In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the United States 
Supreme Court recognized a disparate impact employment 
discrimination claim for the first time.127  The Court found that 
“practices, procedure, or tests neutral on their face, and even 
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 
‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment 
practices.”128  Thus, Title VII protects employees from 
discriminatory employment practices, even when the practices are 
unintentionally discriminatory and are solely the result of 
unconscious employer biases.129 
Under Griggs, a burden shifting analysis is used to determine if 
a meritorious disparate impact claim has been made.130  For a 
plaintiff employee to be successful, the employee must first make 
out a prima facie case by showing that the defendant employer 
used an employment practice that caused a disparate impact on a 
Title VII protected group that the employee is a part of.131  
 
 123 See generally id. at 58–71 (discussing the use of statistical evidence in employment 
discrimination cases). 
 124 Id. 
 125 Hochbaum, supra note 102, at 187. 
 126 Id. at 192. 
 127 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 428 (1971) 
 128 Id. at 430.  In Griggs, the Court invalidated defendant employer’s high school 
diploma requirement for certain blue-collar employment positions where defendant could 
not demonstrate a link between receiving a high school diploma and job performance. Id. 
at 431.  According to a 1960 census statistic, 34% of white males in the state had 
completed high school while only 12% of African-American males had done so. Id. at 
n.6.  In effect, the diploma requirement screened out vastly more blacks than it did whites 
even though there was no intent to discriminate. See id. at 431. 
 129 “Unconscious bias” refers to automatic or implicit stereotypes that are applied to 
certain groups of individuals. See Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in 
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 482 (2005). 
 130 See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. 
 131 See id. at 431.  
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Importantly, the employee need not prove employer intent to cause 
a disparate impact.132  Rather, the employee need only demonstrate 
a significant statistical disparity or proof of harmful effects on the 
protected group based on a specific employer practice or policy.133 
If the employee plaintiff can make out this prima facie case of 
disparate impact, then the burden shifts to the defendant employer 
to attempt to rebut the claim by showing that the contested practice 
is based on a “business necessity” or is “related to job 
performance.”134  If the defendant employer meets its burden, the 
burden shifts back to the plaintiff employee to prove that there are 
alternative practices that are feasible and efficient and that will 
satisfy the employer’s business interests without undesirable 
adverse impact.135  Here, the employee is essentially showing that 
the employer’s business justification is just a “pretext for 
[prohibited] discrimination.”136  If the employee can do this, 
prohibited discrimination will likely be inferred.137 
F. Title VII and the Rooney Rule 
The protections of Title VII led directly to the Rooney Rule’s 
creation.138  Following Cochran and Mehri’s 2002 report, it was 
clear that the NFL had an employment discrimination problem 
with regard to the hiring of head coaches of color.139  And while 
the employment discrimination was likely unintentional and the 
result of unconscious racial biases, it was evident that significant 
racial inequality existed within the NFL’s head coaching ranks.140 
Armed with their 2002 report and keenly aware of Title VII’s 
protections, Cochran and Mehri, on behalf of a group of NFL 
coaches of color, publicly threatened to sue the NFL for 
employment discrimination.141  Because such a claim viably could 
 
 132 See Rutherglen, supra note 100, at 71. 
 133 See Hochbaum, supra note 102, at 192–93. 
 134 See Rutherglen, supra note 100, at 71 (construing Griggs, 401 U.S. 424). 
 135 Id. at 71, 78 (construing Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)).  
 136 Id. at 71. 
 137 See id. 
 138 See Collins, supra note 10, at 887–88. 
 139 See id. at 885–86. 
 140 See Duru, The Fritz Pollard Alliance, supra note 27, at 189. 
 141 See Collins, supra note 10, at 885. 
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have been brought as a Title VII class claim, Cochran and Mehri 
would have had a strong case.142  They would have been able to 
rely heavily on their report’s impressive statistical analysis to make 
a prima facie case of employment discrimination, and because the 
report’s statistical analysis was so thorough and virtually 
irreproachable, the NFL would have had a difficult time rebutting 
the claim that its hiring practices were anything but illegally 
discriminatory.143 
Thus, the NFL—realizing it could lose a publicly damaging 
employment discrimination lawsuit—chose to take affirmative 
remedial action to improve its head coach hiring practices.144  This 
ultimately resulted in the Rooney Rule’s creation and 
implementation.145 
G. Affirmative Action in the United States Private Employment 
Context and the Rooney Rule 
As the preceding section indicates, United States private 
employers are aware of the fact “that they could be held liable 
under Title VII without intentionally discriminating against 
minorities.  As a result, ‘many private employers implemented 
affirmative action programs to avoid future Title VII liability.’”146  
Indeed, this is exactly what the NFL did when it implemented the 
Rooney Rule.147 
Affirmative action programs are positive measures that 
employers adopt to remedy and prevent discrimination against 
 
 142 See id. at 885–86. 
 143 See Duru, The Fritz Pollard Alliance, supra note 27, at 188.   
 144 See Collins, supra note 10, at 886.  It is worth noting that in the 2011 United States 
Supreme Court decision Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the Court actually denied class certification 
to a large group of female plaintiffs that, based largely on factual statistical data, alleged 
that Wal-Mart was engaging in systemic employment discrimination against women. See 
generally 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).  Nevertheless, in 2002 (nine years before the Wal-Mart 
decision), the NFL was wisely unwilling to risk going to trial against Cochran and Mehri 
given then-existing United States employment discrimination law and Supreme Court 
precedent. See Collins, supra note 10, at 887–88. 
 145 See Duru, The Fritz Pollard Alliance, supra note 27, at 189. 
 146 See Collins, supra note 10, at 887–88 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Michael K. 
Braswell et al., Affirmative Action: An Assessment of Its Continuing Role in Employment 
Discrimination Policy, 57 ALB. L. REV. 365, 371 (1993)). 
 147 Id. 
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employees or applicants for employment.148  These programs often 
require the promotion of employees or the interviewing of job 
candidates or hiring of employees based on their status as members 
of a Title VII protected class.149  In the United States, affirmative 
action has frequently been used to remedy past acts of intentional 
workplace discrimination, though it can also be used to remedy 
past acts of unintentional workplace discrimination based on 
unconscious biases.150  In this regard, affirmative action is 
associated with the “remedial perspective” on discrimination, 
which attempts to “extend the laws against employment 
discrimination to intervene in labor markets to foster a broad 
conception of equality,” thereby helping to combat the effects of 
past discrimination.151 
Despite the noble intentions of affirmative action doctrine, 
anything that is branded or characterized as an affirmative action 
policy is almost always met with some resistance in the United 
States.152  The controversy over affirmative action in the United 
States stems primarily from the notion that while Title VII aims 
specifically at ending employment discrimination based on a 
protected category, affirmative action plans by their very nature 
not only encourage but require employment decisions to be made 
based on an employee’s or a potential employee’s status as part of 
a protected class.153 
To elaborate on the genesis of this controversy, “Title VII was 
aimed specifically at ending workplace discrimination” against 
racial minorities.154  However, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail 
Transportation Co., the Supreme Court subsequently interpreted 
Title VII to apply not only to racial minorities, but to Caucasians 
as well.155  As a result, Caucasians who felt that they were unfairly 
disadvantaged by employer affirmative action programs “began 
 
 148 See Rutherglen, supra note 100, at 25. 
 149 See Collins, supra note 10, at 889. 
 150 See Rutherglen, supra note 100, at 25. 
 151 See id. 
 152 See, e.g., Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 
297–98, n.1 (1990). 
 153 See Rutherglen, supra note 100, at 25. 
 154 Collins, supra note 10, at 890. 
 155 See 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
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claiming that employers violated Title VII by considering race 
when making employment decisions.”156 
As Professor Thomas Ross explains, the psychology behind 
these reverse discrimination claims can be deemed the “plight of 
the ‘innocent white victim.’”157  Under this perception of 
affirmative action, it is presumed that the white job applicant or 
employee is not guilty of a past discriminatory act that has denied 
the minority job applicant or employee an employment 
opportunity.158  However, in order to remedy past employment 
discrimination against the protected class to which the minority job 
applicant or employee belongs, affirmative action subordinates the 
white job applicant or employee to the minority job applicant or 
employee in consideration of another employment opportunity.159  
This, it is argued, is unfair and results in “innocent” white 
victims.160 
As Ross points out, the “rhetoric of innocence” is likely a 
misguided stance on affirmative action programs in the United 
States.161  Nevertheless, during the 1970s private employers faced 
serious threats of Title VII lawsuits from unanticipated white 
plaintiff employees.162  Thus, in the absence of congressional 
legislation pertaining to this phenomenon, it was left for the United 
States Supreme Court to decide what was and was not a valid 
affirmative action program in the United States private 
employment context.163 
In United Steelworkers v. Weber and Johnson v. 
Transportation Agency, the Supreme Court created the framework 
for analyzing the validity of private employer affirmative action 
plans challenged under Title VII.164 
 
 156 Collins, supra note 10, at 890. 
 157 Ross, supra note 152, at 300. 
 158 Id. at 300–01. 
 159 See id. at 301. 
 160 Id.  
 161 See id. at 315. 
 162 See Collins, supra note 10, at 890. 
 163 See id. 
 164 Id. at 890–91 (construing United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); 
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987)).  
C06_CORAPI (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2013  2:34 PM 
366 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:341 
Weber was the first Title VII reverse discrimination case to 
reach the Supreme Court.165  In this case, Weber, a white 
employee, sued his employer under Title VII after he was denied 
admission to his employer’s job training program.166  The source 
of Weber’s complaint arose when African-Americans with less 
seniority had been accepted to the program due to a provision in 
the employer’s collective bargaining agreement establishing a 
preference for black employees.167  “Weber argued successfully in 
the lower courts that [this affirmative action] plan was illegal 
because Title VII banned any race-based preference including 
those used as part of affirmative action plans.”168 
The Supreme Court disagreed and ruled against Weber.169  
While acknowledging that Title VII protects minorities as well as 
Caucasians from discrimination, the Supreme Court held that Title 
VII must be read in its legislative and historical context.170  The 
Court found that “Congress intended Title VII to serve as a broad 
remedial tool to tear down social and economic barriers that kept 
many African-Americans poor and unemployed.”171  The Court 
also explained that the legislative history revealed that “Congress 
aimed to encourage voluntary private efforts ‘to eliminate, so far as 
possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page 
in this country’s history.’”172  With this legislative and historical 
backdrop, the Supreme Court reasoned that Weber’s employer’s 
affirmative action program was valid and “that Title VII cannot be 
interpreted as a complete prohibition against ‘private, voluntary, 
race-conscious affirmative action plans.’”173 
 
 165 Id. at 891 (discussing Weber, 443 U.S. 193). 
 166 Weber, 443 U.S. at 199–200. 
 167 Id. at 193. 
 168 Collins, supra note 10, at 891. 
 169 Weber, 443 U.S. at 200–02. 
 170 See Rutherglen, supra note 100, at 95–96. 
 171 Collins, supra note 10, at 891. 
 172 Id. (quoting United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th Cir. 1973)). 
 173 Id. (quoting Weber, 443 U.S. at 208).  Notably, in Weber, the Supreme Court only 
reached the question of the legality of affirmative action plans in the private employment 
context.  This case did not address the power of the federal government to establish 
employment preferences based on a Title VII protected trait. See Rutherglen, supra note 
100, at 95. 
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While the Weber Court did not announce a definitive line for 
what constitutes a valid private employer affirmative action plan, 
the Weber Court focused on two characteristics of Weber’s 
employer’s plan that made it valid under Title VII: 1) it was 
designed to “break down old patterns of racial segregation” and 
erase “manifest racial imbalance” in the workplace; and 2) it did 
not “unnecessarily trammel” the interests of white employees.174 
Subsequently, in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, the 
Supreme Court announced the current standard for analyzing the 
validity of private employer affirmative action plans under Title 
VII.175  In Johnson, while the Court adhered to the decision and 
reasoning used in Weber, it modified its analysis in an important 
way.176  The Court explained that in addition to the two-part Weber 
inquiry, an affirmative action plan will be upheld “only if it were 
flexibly applied according to the proportions of the favored group . 
. . who possessed the qualifications for the job.”177 
As was intended by the Rooney Rule’s drafters, the Rooney 
Rule fits squarely within the Supreme Court’s Weber-Johnson 
framework, an important conclusion for both the “image-conscious 
NFL” and the employees that this rule affects.178 
H. Avoiding the Blitz on the Rooney Rule in the United States 
Today, despite the Rooney Rule’s successes, there are still 
those who advocate for the rule’s discontinuance in the United 
States.179  Essentially, American viewpoints regarding the Rooney 
Rule’s continued use fall into three categories.  First, there are 
those who think that the Rooney Rule has worn out its utility.  
Second, there are those who think that the Rooney Rule has always 
been flawed and never should have been implemented to begin 
 
 174 Rutherglen, supra note 100, at 96 (quoting Weber, 443 U.S. at 208). 
 175 Collins, supra note 10, at 892 (referring to Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 
616, 625 (1987)). 
 176 See Rutherglen, supra note 99, at 97.  
 177 See id. 
 178 Collins, supra note 10, at 900. 
 179 See, e.g., Daymon Johnson, The Rooney Rule: Why It’s Outdated and Unnecessary 
in Today’s NFL, BLEACHER REPORT (Jan. 13, 2011), http://bleacherreport.com/ 
articles/570877-the-rooney-rule-why-its-outdated-and-unnecessary-in-todays-nfl (arguing 
that the Rooney Rule is no longer needed). 
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with.  Finally, there are those who support the Rooney Rule’s 
continued use. 
With regard to the first viewpoint, these advocates claim that 
while the Rooney Rule served a useful purpose, it is no longer 
needed given the marked improvement in racial minority head 
coach and executive hiring.180  Indeed, not only outsiders think 
this, but also at least one minority NFL assistant coach.  Recently, 
in response to a question about the Rooney Rule’s continued use, 
one black assistant coach was quoted as saying, “I never thought 
I’d say this in my lifetime . . . but the playing field is getting even 
faster than I thought was possible.  We’re getting to an equal point 
very quickly.  I didn’t think we’d be here for another 20 years.”181 
Those who believe that the Rooney Rule is no longer needed 
often cite several reasons for their optimistic view that the Rooney 
Rule can be repealed without adverse consequence.  First, people 
of this view cite the fact that racial minority coaches are now more 
likely to be rehired as NFL head coaches, even after being 
previously terminated as a head coach by a NFL team.182  Second, 
many supporters of this view are of the belief that NFL team 
owners are more likely than ever before to hire a minority head 
coach because of the success that minority head coaches have had 
in recent years.183  It is no secret that NFL team owners want to see 
their teams win.  Owners have now seen the success that head 
coaches of color such as Mike Tomlin, Tony Dungy, and Lovie 
Smith have had, and thus there is a growing confidence that other 
team owners will try to replicate this hiring practice rather than 
operating under the misguided belief that minority coaches are 
inferior in coaching ability to white coaches.184  Finally, and 
perhaps the most salient point cited in support of the Rooney 
Rule’s repeal, is that NFL team ownership is growing younger.185  
 
 180 Id. 
 181 Mike Freeman, With So Much Progress, Is Rooney Rule Still Necessary?, CBS 
SPORTS.COM (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/story/11306795. 
 182 Id. (noting that African-American coaches like Dennis Green and Herm Edwards 
were rehired by other clubs). 
 183 See id. (stating that the success of African-American head coaches Dungy and Smith 
assisted in eradicating fears about hiring African-American coaches). 
 184 See id.  
 185 Id. 
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Younger NFL team owners, having grown up in an age where 
discrimination and racism are considered socially unacceptable, are 
more likely to inherently employ fair hiring practices than NFL 
owners who owned teams during the height of United States 
segregation through the late twentieth century.186  This theory rests 
upon the widely held belief that, as previously stated, “individual 
attitudes, values, and beliefs in the broader society become an 
integral part of sporting practices.”187 
In addition to those who believe that the Rooney Rule no 
longer serves a useful purpose, there remain others who think that 
the Rooney Rule has always been flawed and never should have 
been implemented in the first place.188  As is the case with most 
affirmative action plans in the United States, there is a significant 
segment insisting that any rule that requires decision making based 
on race, regardless of the rule’s purpose, does more to impede 
equality than create it.189  The Rooney Rule is no different.190  
Those that subscribe to this view argue that it is unjust not only to 
NFL team owners to require them to account for race when 
determining head coaching and executive candidates, but also to 
the racial minority head coaching and executive candidates 
themselves.191 
The perceived injustice stems from a belief that if a team 
knows who it wants to hire as a head coach or executive, then it 
should not have to go through the process of interviewing other 
head coach and executive candidates.192  When it is forced to do so 
by rule, the only results are sham interviews, which, it is argued, 
 
 186 Id. 
 187 Davis, Race and Sports in America: An Historical Overview, supra note 33, at 291–
92 (quoting George H. Sage, INTRODUCTION TO DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN 
COLLEGE SPORTS 5 (D. Brooke & R. Althouse eds., 2007)).  
 188 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 179 (explaining the Rooney Rule forces NFL owners 
to interview people that may not be qualified). 
 189 See id. 
 190 See id. 
 191 See Ryan Isley, “Rooney Rule” Claims Another Victim in Perry Fewell, 
CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 14, 2011, 12:21 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/dsn/index.ssf/ 
2011/01/rooney_rule_claims_another_victim_in_perry_fewell.html (discussing how the 
rule has resulted in “teams bring[ing] in [minority] coaches that they know they have 
absolutely no intention of hiring just to meet the league’s requirement”).   
 192 Hochbaum, supra note 102, at 184. 
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are demeaning and a waste of time for racial minority head 
coaching and executive candidates.193 
Finally, there are those who believe that the Rooney Rule still 
serves a useful purpose and plays an integral part in creating and 
maintaining equal employment opportunities for racial minority 
NFL head coaches and executives.194  Those sharing this view 
explain that even though the NFL has evolved and improved its 
hiring practices over the last ten years, this development alone 
does not mean there is no longer a need for the Rooney Rule.195  
As the Pittsburgh Steelers’ team President Art Rooney II recently 
explained: 
I know people have wondered whether some of the 
interviews have been genuine or not. . . .  But the 
rule is still helping people get interviews.  I hope 
there comes a time when we don’t need it, but I’m 
not sure we’re there yet.  Certainly, a lot of progress 
has been made and it’s working.  I don’t see any 
need to change it at this point.196 
Similarly, those supporting this view also argue that while the 
Rooney Rule may have its flaws, it still does far more good than 
harm.197  Indeed, many commentators suggest that, contrary to 
arguments espoused by those who have objected to the Rooney 
Rule’s use since its inception, a face-to-face interview that does 
not result in a hiring still begets meaningful discussion and fosters 
consideration that ultimately contributes to increased diversity.198  
Moreover, as the Pittsburgh Steelers African-American head coach 
Mike Tomlin correctly points out, the Rooney Rule helps bring to 
 
 193 Id.  
 194 See id. at 184–85. 
 195 Clifton Brown, So Far, NFL’s Rooney Rule is Working, SPORTING NEWS (Jan. 17, 
2011, 8:24 AM), http://aol.sportingnews.com/nfl/story/2011-01-17/so-far-nfls-rooney-
rule-is-working. 
 196 Id. 
 197 See, e.g., Hochbaum, supra note 102, at 185. 
 198 See, e.g., id.  See also Duru, The Fritz Pollard Alliance, supra note 27, at 195 
(explaining that those minority head coaching candidates that do get interviews, but do 
not get hired initially, are still more likely to get a head coaching job in the future based 
on having had the opportunity to have the initial interview and demonstrating that they 
are qualified head coaching candidates). 
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public light a dialogue regarding how to improve race relations in 
the workplace.199  Tomlin explains: 
I’ve always had a great deal of belief in my 
abilities, and I thought that if I continued to work 
and do good things, that eventually I would get my 
opportunity—Rooney Rule or no.  But I definitely 
see the usefulness of such a rule, and if nothing else, 
it keeps some debatable things in the public light, 
which is good.200 
Because the NFL is one of the most high-profile employers in 
the United States—in addition to being the most popular United 
States professional sport201—the NFL’s discussion of race relations 
in its workplace helps generate a broader dialogue about the 
continued need to improve race relations in the United States, both 
in the workplace and more generally.  In turn, this dialogue helps 
lead to actual improvements in United States race relations. 
I. The Rooney Rule and the United States Today 
Today, the United States is no longer a country where 
intentional and overt racism is accepted in the private employment 
context.202  Nevertheless, unconscious biases still play a large part 
in how United States private employers make employment 
decisions.203  The NFL’s history makes clear that United States 
professional sports leagues are not impervious to this 
phenomenon.204 
While many in the United States are skeptical of affirmative 
action programs and question their legality, unconscious bias leads 
to unintentional discrimination, which is not easily recognizable.205  
 
 199 See Freeman, supra note 181. 
 200 Id. 
 201 See While Gap Narrows, Professional Football Retains Lead over Baseball as 
Favorite Sport, HARRIS INTERACTIVE (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.harris 
interactive.com/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/tabid/447/mid/1508/articleId/675/ctl/ReadCusto
m%20Default/Default.aspx. 
 202 See Lee, supra note 129, at 482. 
 203 See id. 
 204 See Collins, supra note 10, at 873–75. 
 205 See id. at 912.   
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As a result, it will not disappear unless specifically and 
affirmatively addressed.206  The Rooney Rule, like other 
affirmative action programs used by United States private 
employers, compels corporate decision-makers to confront their 
own unconscious biases by requiring meaningful interview 
opportunities and dialogue with racial minority head coaching and 
executive candidates.207  This in turn helps eradicate employment 
inequality in both the NFL and the United States at large. 
While the Rooney Rule may not be the perfect remedy for 
tackling discriminatory hiring practices in the NFL, without it 
unintentional discrimination would likely continue, as team owners 
would persist in relying on unconscious biases when choosing 
head coaching and executive candidates.208  The fact that the 
Rooney Rule and other affirmative action plans are regularly used 
in the United States private employment context today indicates 
how far the country has come in trying to achieve employment 
equality and also how difficult it is to erase the vestiges of past 
discrimination.209  Although there is still room for significant 
improvement with respect to United States private employer hiring 
practices, affirmative action programs such as the Rooney Rule 
have undoubtedly advanced racial equality in both the NFL and the 
United States workplace. 
II. THE OTHER FOOTBALL210: THE CONFLICT OVER THE ROONEY 
RULE’S USE IN ENGLISH PROFESSIONAL SOCCER 
In order to understand why implementation of a version of the 
Rooney Rule would likely be effective in combating racial 
disparity in the hiring of managers and executives of color in 
English professional soccer, it is necessary to highlight how the 
NFL’s version of the Rooney Rule would fit within the larger 
British employment discrimination law discourse.  This requires an 
analysis of the employment discrimination history that English 
 
 206 See id. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. 
 210 In England, the term “football” is used instead of “soccer.” 
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professional soccer shares with the NFL and its relationship to 
Title VII-analogous British employment discrimination law and 
policy. 
A. English Professional Soccer: Racism and Employment 
Discrimination Against Racial Minority Managers and 
Executives 
While both the NFL and English professional soccer have had 
to deal with player race issues, racial minority player employment 
discrimination has never really been a sizable problem for English 
professional soccer.211  Nevertheless, the two entities have 
startlingly similar employment discrimination histories as it 
pertains to the hiring of head coaches and executives of color. 
In English professional soccer, although the number of ethnic 
and racial minority English professional soccer players has steadily 
increased over the years, the number of managers and executives 
of color has not.212  In fact, while today more than a quarter of the 
players in the Premier League and the Football League are of a 
racial minority, there were only two club managers of color 
employed by the ninety-two combined Premier League and the 
Football League clubs to start the 2011 season.213 
As was the case in the NFL, this current employment 
discrimination problem can likely be attributed to English 
professional soccer’s predominantly white management and its 
unconscious racial biases and unintentionally discriminatory hiring 
practices.214 
In her discussion of a recent Staffordshire University English 
soccer fan survey regarding racism in English professional soccer, 
British newspaper columnist Lucy Tobin explains: 
 
 211 See generally Ian Cook, A Sociological Study of Race and Managerial Positions in 
English Professional Football (April 2009) (unpublished MSc dissertation, University of 
Leicester) (on file with Football Unites, Racism Divides), available at 
http://www.furd.org/resources/Race%20and%20Managerial%20Positions.pdf (studying 
the existence of underlying racial tension in English Professional Football that had not 
been previously acknowledged). 
 212 See Tobin, supra note 19. 
 213 See Mann, supra note 25. 
 214 See Tobin, supra note 19. 
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The academics report that fans believe “institutional 
racism”—where people do not consciously 
discriminate against minorities, but fail to challenge 
old assumptions and stereotypes, meaning a pattern 
of operations continues—is relevant in football 
management.  One survey respondent said: “People 
appoint people like themselves.  White chairmen 
appoint white, male managers.  The cycle is not 
easily broken.”  Dismissing the idea that black 
managers will come through as the higher numbers 
of black players mature, another said: “Football 
boards have very few ethnic minorities on them—
that’s more likely to be the issue than the players or 
backroom staff.  It’s an old boys’ club that is 
unlikely to bring in people from outside their peer 
group.”215 
Exacerbating this problem, as Professor N. Jeremi Duru points 
out in his discussion of the past plight of NFL head coaching 
candidates of color, is the fact that it is difficult for racial minority 
managerial candidates to overcome an implicit notion of inferior 
coaching ability.216  While minority soccer players during the 
1970s and 1980s dispelled any idea of inferior soccer playing 
ability simply by “showing off their skills” in a few games, 
managerial skill is not so evident.217  Rather, it needs an 
opportunity and chance to develop.218 
In the English professional soccer context, however, this 
opportunity has long evaded the vast majority of racial minority 
managerial and executive candidates because of white 
management’s biased hiring preferences and its past practices.219  
For example, the Premier League’s predominantly white 
 
 215 Id. 
 216 See Duru, The Fritz Pollard Alliance, supra note 27, at 184. 
 217 Tobin, supra note 19.  Interestingly, and much like in the NFL, however, there is 
evidence that during the 1980s black English professional soccer players were 
significantly underrepresented at positions that require greater decision-making ability 
rather than speed (i.e., center midfielder and center striker). See Cook, supra note 211, at 
19.  Today, this is no longer a problem in English professional soccer. See id. 
 218 See Tobin, supra note 19 
 219 Id. 
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management mandated that to be a Premier League club 
managerial candidate, an individual applicant needs to have a 
UEFA-A220coaching badge and Pro License.221  Even if the 
individual applicant has previously played English professional 
soccer, it is very difficult to obtain these qualifications without also 
having had past managerial experience with an English 
professional soccer club.222 
Obviously, this rule serves to ensure managerial competence, 
but for a long time it also had the devastating side effect of 
preventing most racial minorities from ever getting an opportunity 
to manage at English professional soccer’s elite levels.223  Because 
white Premier League club chairmen demonstrated a preference for 
hiring white managerial candidates as Premier League club 
managers, most individuals of color typically did not get the 
managerial experience needed to obtain the prerequisite UEFA 
coaching badge and Pro license.224  Consequently, these minority 
applicants were kept out of the running for Premier League club 
managerial consideration. 
Despite the fact that as of 2010 the number of racial minority 
managerial candidates that achieved these qualifications had risen 
to 25%, there still has not been an uptick in the actual number of 
racial minority managers.225  Indeed, the number of racial minority 
managers has actually fallen from only six in 2003 to, as 
previously stated, merely two in 2011.226  This has been explained 
as a by-product of the same type of pre-Rooney Rule syndrome in 
the NFL that flared up whenever a team was looking to fill a head 
coaching vacancy.  As one black former league club manager 
 
 220 UEFA is the acronym used for the Union of European Football Associations.  It is 
the administrative body for association football in Europe. See Overview, UEFA.COM, 
http://www.uefa.com/uefa/aboutuefa/organisation/history/index.html (last visited Nov. 
21, 2012). 
 221 See Cook, supra note 211, at 21. 
 222 Id.  
 223 Id. at 21, 66. 
 224 See id. at 74. 
 225 Anna Kessel, Lack of Black Football Managers is a Problem That Won’t Go Away, 
THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 30, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/oct/ 31/black-
football-managers. 
 226 Id. 
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stated, “[w]hen a manger [sic] loses his job, within hours someone 
already on the management merry-go-round is installed as 
favourite without considering the merits of an outsider.”227  Given 
this practice and that racial minority managerial candidates have 
proven to be the “outsiders,” it is evident that English professional 
soccer has essentially created a cyclical hiring system that 
effectively prohibits the possibility that a significant number of 
racial minority managers will ever manage different league clubs 
at the same time. 
Perhaps most disappointing about this entire situation is that 
English professional soccer and the British government have 
known about this problem for years and yet have not taken enough 
action to remedy it.228  Indeed, in 1998 the Football Task Force 
brought this issue to the attention of the British Minister for Sport 
so that it could be addressed, and several related reports and 
studies have been subsequently conducted, all of them highlighting 
the glaring absence of managers and executives of color in English 
professional soccer.229  Nevertheless, tremendous racial disparity 
in English professional soccer’s managerial and executive ranks 
still exists. 
B. “Positive Action” Versus “Positive Discrimination” in British 
Employment Discrimination Law 
Similarly to the United States’ Title VII protected classes, 
Britain also has legislatively established classes against which an 
 
 227 See Tobin, supra note 19; see, e.g., Cook, supra note 211, at 27 (explaining that 
following black manager John Barnes’ firing from the Celtic soccer club in 2000, he was 
not able to gain another managerial role until 2008, when he was hired by the Jamaican 
national team). 
 228 See FOOTBALL TASK FORCE, ELIMINATING RACISM FROM FOOTBALL: A REPORT BY 
THE FOOTBALL TASK FORCE (1998), available at http://www.furd.org/resources/ 
ftfracism.pdf (submitted to the British Minister for Sport) (explaining how racism in 
English Professional Soccer has been a “fringe issue,” and that while some action has 
been taken to resolve it, the issue remains and must be addressed in a more intensive 
fashion). 
 229 See id.; see also Tobin, supra note 19 (“[A]cademics at Staffordshire University 
who have undertaken major research into the subject, report a string call among black and 
minority ethnic (BME) football fans for the introduction of positive discrimination.”). 
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employer cannot discriminate.230  Britain’s Equality Act of 2010, 
which amended its Equality Act of 2006, provides that it shall be 
illegal for any employer to discriminate against any individual 
based on “age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage or civil 
partnership, pregnancy or maternity, race, religion or belief 
[(including lack of belief)], sex, [or] sexual orientation.”231  Unlike 
the United States, however, under British law voluntary private 
employer affirmative action plans (or voluntary private employer 
“positive action” plans as they are known in Great Britain)232 were 
for many years only permissible in a few specific employment 
settings.233  Differing from the United States Supreme Court’s 
affirmative action rulings in Weber and Johnson, the British 
legislature was for the most part unwilling to allow employer 
discrimination based on an individual’s or a group’s protected 
class status, regardless of the employer’s benign reason for the 
discrimination.234 
In 2010 this all changed.  In light of the growing concern over 
the employment disparity between some majority and minority 
groups in certain areas of the British workforce, Britain’s 
legislature fundamentally altered its laws with respect to voluntary 
private employer positive action plans.235  The legislature passed 
the Equality Act of 2010 (the “Equality Act”) under which 
voluntary private employer positive action plans are now generally 
 
 230 Compare Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) 
(1964), with Equality Act, 2010, c. 15, § 4 (U.K.). 
 231 Equality Act, 2010, c. 15, § 4. 
 232 Id. c. 15, § 158. 
 233 See DR. RAVINDER SINGH DHAMI ET AL., DEVELOPING POSITIVE ACTION POLICIES: 
LEARNING FROM THE EXPERIENCES OF EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 20 (Dept. of Work 
and Pensions ed., 2006) (noting the evolution of The Race Relations Act 1976 to cover 
more employment settings, with the original Act only covering “employment, education, 
training, [and] housing”). 
 234 See e.g., Leland Ware, A Comparative Analysis of Unconscious and Institutional 
Discrimination in the United States and Britain, 36 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89, 152 
(2007) (providing an example of a typical case in which the British legislature 
acknowledged that “institutional racism does not state a cause of action under the Race 
Relations Act”). 
 235 See Christopher Hope & Tom Ross, Britain Embraces ‘Positive Action’ to Abolish 
Workplace Discrimination, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 2, 2010, 9:15 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/8177872/Britain-embraces-positive-action-to-
abolish-workplace-discrimination.html. 
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permitted so long as they meet certain statutorily prescribed 
criteria.236  The criteria are set forth in the Equality Act’s positive 
action provisions—sections 158 and 159—and became effective in 
April 2011.237 
Section 159 of the Equality Act permits voluntary private 
employer positive action plans aimed specifically at promoting or 
recruiting protected class members.238  This was something that 
was previously prohibited under British law.239  Taken as a whole, 
section 159 of the Equality Act “permits an employer to take a 
protected characteristic into consideration when deciding whom to 
recruit or promote, where people having the protected 
characteristic are at a disadvantage or are underrepresented” in the 
workplace.240  “Any action taken [by the employer under this 
section] must be a proportionate means of addressing such 
disadvantage or underrepresentation.”241 
Moreover, the employer may only engage in this practice when 
the employment candidate whose protected characteristic is being 
considered is as qualified for the position as all of the other 
employment candidates.242  Whether a candidate is qualified is 
“not a matter only of academic qualification, but rather a 
judgement [sic] based on the criteria the employer uses to establish 
who is best for the job.”243  This could include criteria such as 
“suitability, competence, and professional performance.”244  As an 
illustration of the type of conduct that is permissible under section 
159, the Equality Act’s explanatory note for section 159 provides 
the following example: 
[a] police service which employs disproportionately 
low numbers of people from an ethnic minority 
background identifies a number of candidates who 
 
 236 See Equality Act, 2010, c. 15, §§ 158–59. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. c. 2 § 159. 
 239 See Equality Act, 2010, c. 15, § 159, Explanatory Notes, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/notes/division/3/11/2/2. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. 
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are as qualified as each other for recruitment to a 
post, including a candidate from an under-
represented ethnic minority background.  It would 
not be unlawful to give preferential treatment to that 
candidate, provided the comparative merits of the 
other candidates were also taken into 
consideration.245 
Significantly, the Equality Act still does not allow for what 
British law calls “positive discrimination.”246  Positive 
discrimination means automatically favoring a candidate, 
regardless of merit, solely because he or she has a particular 
protected characteristic.247  The explanatory note to section 159 of 
the Equality Act makes clear that such employer discrimination is 
still prohibited when it states that this “section does not allow 
employers to have a policy or practice of automatically treating 
people who share a protected characteristic more favourably than 
those who do not have it.”248  As an illustration of the type of 
conduct that is impermissible under section 159, the Equality Act’s 
explanatory note for section 159 provides the example of “[a]n 
employer offer[ing] a job to a woman on the basis that women are 
underrepresented in the company’s workforce when there was a 
male candidate who was more qualified.”249 
It is also noteworthy that the Equality Act’s positive action 
provisions are in accordance with European Union law.250  As EU 
law is supreme over the laws of each of the EU’s member states in 
areas in which the EU has the capacity to legislate, any member 
state that promulgates a law in one of these areas that is contrary to 
EU law will not only have its law reviewed, but will also likely 
 
 245 Id. 
 246 See Louisa Peacock, Equality Act Explained: Positive Discrimination Versus 
Positive Action, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 2, 2010, 5:48 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
finance/jobs/8177447/Equality-Act-explained-positive-discrimination-versus-positive-
action.html. 
 247 Id. 
 248 See Equality Act, 2010, Explanatory Notes, supra note 239. 
 249 Id. 
 250 See Jarrett Haskovec, A Beast of a Burden? The New EU Burden-Of-Proof 
Arrangement in Cases of Employment Discrimination Compared to Existing U.S. Law, 14 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1069, 1083 (2005). 
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have its law struck down.251  As the United Kingdom is an EU 
member state and the EU has the power to legislate over European 
employment matters, the Equality Act and its positive action 
provisions are subject to EU legal scrutiny.252 
European Union law does, however, allow for “positive action” 
by EU member states.253  In fact, EU directives state that EU 
member states may maintain or adopt “specific measures to 
prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to any prohibited 
ground for discriminating.”254  Consequently, the Equality Act’s 
positive action provisions are consistent with EU law, and 
therefore, are valid under existing EU law. 
C. Section 159 of the Equality Act is a Catalyst for the Rooney 
Rule’s Implementation in English Professional Soccer 
The British legislature’s expansion of British employment 
discrimination law to allow for private employer positive action 
programs in the employee recruitment and promotion context is 
consistent with the British government’s overall efforts over the 
last decade to afford greater anti-discrimination law protection to 
minority employees.255  It has also helped to remedy past acts of 
both intentional and unintentional employment discrimination in a 
wide variety of British workplaces.256  One of these workplaces is 
undoubtedly English professional soccer’s.257 
 
 251 See id. at 1084.  
 252 See Annette M. Schuller, Paul G. Thompson & David B. Wilson, Doing Business in 
the European Union: An Overview of Common Legal Issues, 31COLO. LAW. 9, 9 n.2, 10 
(2002) (stating that EU law is “legally binding on the EU Member States”).   
 253 See Haskovec, supra note 250, at 1083. 
 254 Id. at 1083–84 (citing Council Directive 00/43, art. 5, 2000 O.J. (L 180) (EC); 
Council Directive 00/78, art. 7, 2000 O.J. (L 303) (EC); Council Directive 02/73, art. 
1(7), 2002 O.J. (L 269) (EC)). 
 255 See Ware, supra note 234, at 141 (stating that British antidiscrimination laws have 
been considerably expanded over the last decade). 
 256 Id. 
 257 See Cameron Hosts Anti-Racism Summit, supra note 5 (stating that “more black and 
minority ethnic people were needed as top-level managers and coaches”); see also 
Government and Football Bodies Unite to Tackle Discrimination, NUMBER 10, THE 
OFFICIAL SITE OF THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE (Feb. 22, 2012), 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/tackle-football-discrimination (averring that a new 
“facility will be used to help increase the number of qualified coaches in the country . . . 
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With regard to English professional soccer, the recent 
enactment and validity of section 159 of the Equality Act greatly 
enhances the likelihood that a version of the Rooney Rule can be 
implemented in English professional soccer.  To elaborate, the 
Rooney Rule is a private employer mandate intended to address 
clear racial minority disadvantage and underrepresentation in the 
workplace.258  In the English professional soccer employment 
context such a rule would require that through interviews, league 
clubs recruit racial minority managerial and executive candidates 
as a way of creating employment equality within these positions.  
This is exactly what section 159 is intended to permit and what 
was unlawful in Great Britain until the Equality Act’s positive 
action provisions became effective in April 2011.259 
Moreover, while the Rooney Rule’s implementation in English 
professional soccer would certainly be a drastic measure, it cannot 
legitimately be claimed that such action would be disproportionate 
in response to the current racial inequality that exists in English 
professional soccer’s managerial and executive ranks.  Indeed, as 
previously mentioned, only two out of ninety-two league clubs 
employed managers of color at the start of 2011.260 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, English professional 
soccer could craft a version of the Rooney Rule that does not run 
afoul of Britain’s positive discrimination prohibition.  The NFL’s 
version of the Rooney Rule does not require NFL teams to take 
candidate merit into account when determining who to interview 
for Rooney Rule compliance purposes.261  While NFL teams 
typically do pay attention to candidate merit when complying with 
the Rooney Rule, there is ultimately no requirement that they do 
so.262  Rather, it mandates an unconditional racial minority 
 
encourage more people from Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) backgrounds to gain the 
necessary credentials for coaching and managerial positions at the top of the game”). 
 258 See Collins, supra note 10, at 888. 
 259 See Equality Act, 2010, c. 2, § 159 (U.K.). 
 260 See id. 
 261 Maravent, supra note 38, at 264 (stating that compliance with the Rooney Rule 
“simply calls for interviewing a minority candidate” and nothing else).  
 262 See, e.g., Associated Press, Tomlin Proof NFL’s Rooney Rule is Working as 
Intended, PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW (Jan. 22, 2007), http://www.pittsburghlive.com 
/x/pittsburghtrib/sports/steelers/s_489701.html#ixzz1qeDXDYWx (noting that minority 
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interview quota where at least one racial minority head coaching or 
executive candidate must be interviewed, even if all of these 
minority candidates lack qualification when compared to the other 
existing head coaching or executive candidates.263  The result of 
this is that Britain’s positive discrimination prohibition would 
likely prevent English professional soccer from implementing an 
exact replica of the NFL’s version of the Rooney Rule.264  As 
previously discussed, this is because an employer mandate that 
allows an employer to favor an employment candidate based on a 
“protected trait” and without regard to candidate merit, even as it 
pertains to employment interviewing, is explicitly prohibited under 
section 159 of the Equality Act.265 
Nevertheless, section 159 of the Equality Act still permits 
English professional soccer league clubs to positively factor in a 
managerial or executive candidate’s minority race when 
determining which candidates to recruit for an open managerial or 
executive position.266  As previously stated, such protected trait 
consideration would be permissible under the Equality Act so long 
as the racial minority candidate is as qualified as all of the other 
candidates vying for the open managerial or executive position and 
is from an underrepresented minority employee group.267  Thus, 
English professional soccer could still legally adopt a version of 
the Rooney Rule.  However, such a mandate would have to 
account for this important difference in British employment law. 
D. Britain Acknowledges Interest in the Rooney Rule’s 
Application to English Professional Soccer 
After years of procrastination, it appears that English 
professional soccer is finally warming to the idea of taking 
 
coaching candidate Mike Tomlin was selected because of “motivation, enthusiasm and 
organizational skills,” evidencing that NFL teams do consider the candidate’s merit when 
complying with the Rooney Rule). 
 263 Maravent, supra note 38, at 248–49. 
 264 See Nicola Tager, No Room for Rooney, SPORT BUSINESS (Sept. 9, 2011, 4:49 PM), 
http://www.sportbusiness.com/blog/no-room-for-rooney-184280. 
 265 See Equality Act, 2010, c. 2, § 159 (U.K.). 
 266 See Equality Act, 2010, Explanatory Notes, supra note 2369. 
 267 Id. 
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significant action to help achieve racial equality in English 
professional soccer’s managerial and executive ranks.268 
Following intensified domestic and international pressure to 
tackle racial disparity in the hiring of English professional soccer 
club managers and executives, English professional soccer’s 
leaders publicly noted in September 2011 that they were intrigued 
by the NFL’s Rooney Rule and what it might be able to do for 
English professional soccer’s employment discrimination 
problem.269  Interestingly, this declaration was coupled with a 
presentation to these same leaders by Rooney Rule co-creator, 
attorney Cyrus Mehri.270  During his presentation, Mehri outlined 
how the Rooney Rule could help address the lack of black and 
ethnic minority managers and executives in English professional 
soccer.271 
Notably, following the presentation, Mehri expressed optimism 
that a version of the Rooney Rule could be adopted by English 
professional soccer.272  He explained, “I’m very confident that 
when they study this issue they’re going to reach the same 
conclusion that the bosses in the NFL reached, which was it may 
not be perfect but there is no better solution and we have to address 
this issue.”273 
Consistent with his prediction, since Mehri’s September 2011 
presentation, several key individuals from English professional 
soccer’s management, including Football League chairman Greg 
Clarke, have spoken out in support of the Rooney Rule’s 
implementation.274  Clarke has publicly backed the future 
implementation of a version of the Rooney Rule in the Football 
 
 268 See, e.g., David Anderson, We Will Have Rooney Rule in England Says League 
Chairman, MIRROR FOOTBALL (Sept. 14, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://www. 
mirrorfootball.co.uk/news/Football-League-chairman-Greg-Clarke-backs-Mirror-Open-
Goal-campaign-more-black-managers-article799223.html. 
 269 Jack Bell, British Soccer Officials Intrigued by NFL’s Rooney Rule, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 29, 2011, http://goal.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/in-britain-n-f-l-s-rooney-rule-
is-seen-as-model-for-hiring-minority-coaches. 
 270 See Mann, supra note 25. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id. 
 273 Id. 
 274 See Anderson, supra note 268. 
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League.275  Moreover, Professional Footballers’ Association 
(“PFA”)276 chief Gordon Taylor has also spoken out in support of 
the implementation of a version of the Rooney Rule in English 
professional soccer.277  In fact, Taylor has been one of the biggest 
supporters of the Rooney Rule’s implementation, calling for a 
“consensus” from all of English professional soccer to adopt the 
Rooney Rule.278 
Furthermore, in addition to those working in English 
professional soccer, important British institutions outside the sport 
have also taken positions that support the rationale behind the 
Rooney Rule’s implementation.  While the British government has 
not officially said that it supports the Rooney Rule’s 
implementation, Prime Minister David Cameron has repeatedly 
stated that more racial and ethnic minorities are needed in 
managerial positions in English professional soccer.279  Consistent 
with these sentiments, British Culture Secretary Jeremy Hunt 
recently announced that the British government is contributing £3 
million to the Football Association’s National Football Centre.280  
This money will be used in part to help fund specific initiatives 
aimed at encouraging people of minority background to gain the 
necessary credentials to become managers in English professional 
soccer.281 
To date, however, no version of the Rooney Rule has been 
adopted by either the Premier League or the Football League as 
both organizations are in the process of determining whether the 
Rooney Rule is a legally and commercially viable solution to its 
 
 275 Id. 
 276 The Professional Footballers’ Association is the players union for professional 
soccer players in England and Wales. James G. Irving, Red Card: The Battle of European 
Football’s Transfer System. 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 667, 670, 679 (2002).  
 277 See Harry Harris, PFA Chief Wants “Consensus” on Rooney Rule, ESPN FC (Sept. 
9, 2011), http://soccernet.espn.go.com/news/story/_/id/954300/pfa-chief-wants-?cc=5901. 
 278 Id. 
 279 See Cameron Hosts Anti-Racism Summit, supra note 5. 
 280 See Government and Football Bodies Unite to Tackle Discrimination, NUMBER 10, 
THE OFFICIAL SITE OF THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE (Feb. 22, 2012), 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/tackle-football-discrimination/. 
 281 Id. 
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employment discrimination problem.282  In fact, Premier League 
chief executive Richard Scudamore recently spoke out against the 
Rooney Rule’s implementation in English professional soccer, 
doubting its feasibility.283  In a November 2011 interview with 
British radio station Talksport, Scudamore explained, “[w]e have 
to make sure the grassroots system in place means there are no 
barriers or difficulties for coaches coming through.  But I only 
work for the Premier League and, when there are only 20 jobs, you 
cannot imagine filling quotas.  It’s impossible.”284  Scudamore 
went on to justify his position by saying that he “believe[s] in 
affirmative action” but that “[i]n America it is a different sport and 
a different country” and that “if people are good enough, then they 
will get chances.”285  Scudamore’s statements were particularly 
disappointing in light of the fact that Scudamore wields 
considerable influence over Premier League governance and 
employment matters.  Furthermore, some other industry insiders 
and legal experts have raised questions about the legality of 
implementing a version of the Rooney Rule in English professional 
soccer.286  As employment solicitor Nicola Tager of British media 
and entertainment law firm Harbottle & Lewis explains: 
The PFA’s commitment to exploring ways in which 
it can achieve a greater number of black managers 
in football is entirely legitimate and laudable. . . . 
However, in so far as the PFA hopes to introduce a 
comparable [Rooney Rule] requirement in the 
UK—namely that a certain minimum number of 
black candidates must be interviewed for each 
managerial role that becomes available—such a 
 
 282 See generally Anderson, supra note 268 (stating that as of September 2011, leaders 
of English soccer organizations, including the Football League and the Premier League, 
were still in the process of considering an English version of the Rooney Rule). 
 283 Richard Scudamore Rules Out Premier League “Rooney Rule” and 39th Game, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2011, 11:15 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2011/ 
nov/25/richard-scudamore-rooney-rule-39-game?newsfeed=true. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. 
 286 See Tager, supra note 264. 
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quota is arguably unlawful under the UK Equality 
Act 2010.287 
While concerns like solicitor Tager’s are legitimate, the 
remainder of this Note will focus on quelling any fear that English 
professional soccer’s implementation of a version of the Rooney 
Rule would be legally or commercially unfeasible and provide a 
specific way in which the Rooney Rule can be crafted so that it 
complies with both English professional soccer’s legal and 
business needs. 
III. THE GAME PLAN: IMPLEMENTING THE ROONEY RULE IN 
ENGLISH PROFESSIONAL SOCCER 
This last section analyzes the overall viability and utility of 
implementing a version of the Rooney Rule in English professional 
soccer.  Ultimately, it advocates for its adoption by both the 
Premier League and the Football League and sets forth a detailed 
version of the rule that English professional soccer could 
effectively implement.  As seen in the NFL’s case, the Rooney 
Rule compels all of the NFL teams’ predominantly white decision-
makers to confront their own unconscious racial biases by 
requiring meaningful interview opportunities and dialogue with 
racial minority head coaching and executive candidates.288  This in 
turn has helped to significantly mitigate unintentional employment 
discrimination against these parties in the NFL workplace.289  
Given the Rooney Rule’s success in the NFL and the comparable 
employment discrimination problem that English professional 
soccer is now facing, English professional soccer should not 
hesitate in implementing a version of the Rooney Rule. 
 
 287 Id.  
 288 See Collins, supra note 10, at 912. 
 289 See e.g., LAPCHICK ET AL., NFL RACIAL AND GENDER REPORT CARD, supra note 24, 
at 8 (stating that as of September 2011, there were seven African-American NFL head 
coaches and one Latino NFL head coach.). 
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A. Crafting the Rooney Rule so that it Complies with Section 159 
of the Equality Act and Still Maintains its Force 
As previously stated, section 159 of the Equality Act permits 
English professional soccer league clubs to positively factor in a 
managerial or an executive candidate’s minority race when 
determining which candidates to recruit for an open managerial or 
executive position.290  Such protected trait consideration would be 
permissible under the Equality Act so long as the racial minority 
candidate is from an underrepresented minority group in the 
employer’s workforce and is as qualified as all of the other 
candidates vying for the open managerial or executive position.291 
In practice, this means establishing a Rooney Rule mandate 
that whenever a league club has a job vacancy at the managerial or 
executive level and there is at least one racial minority candidate 
that is as qualified to fill the vacancy as all of the other candidates, 
the club’s decision-makers must interview at least one of these 
qualified minority candidates before filling the vacancy.292  If the 
club determines in good faith that no such qualified racial minority 
candidate exists, this mandate would not apply to the club and the 
club need not interview a racial minority candidate.293  As has 
proved effective in the NFL, each club’s managerial hiring process 
and decision would be reviewed by the League Chairman’s 
office294 so as to ensure that discriminatory hiring practices are not 
being employed.  Moreover, violation of this mandate would result 
in stiff league-imposed sanctions at the chairman’s discretion. 
 
 290 See Equality Act, 2010, Explanatory Notes, supra note 239. 
 291 Id. 
 292 See Graeme Bailey, Call for “Rooney Rule”, SKY SPORTS (Sept. 8, 2011, 11:35 
AM), http://www1.skysports.com/football/news/12028/7160085/Call-for-Rooney-Rule-.  
 293 Id. (explaining that the English professional soccer version of the Rooney Rule 
should not necessarily always require a black or racial minority candidate interview; 
rather, whether such interview is required should depend on the caliber and qualifications 
of the minority candidate).  
 294 In English professional soccer, the League Chairman is the equivalent of the NFL 
Commissioner. Compare THE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION PREMIER LEAGUE LIMITED, 
PREMIER LEAGUE HANDBOOK SEASON 2012/13 III, VI (2012) (describing the League 
Chairman’s responsibilities), with NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, THE CONSTITUTION AND 
BYLAWS OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, art. VIII (2006) (describing the role of the 
Commissioner).  
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Such a version of the Rooney Rule neatly complies with both 
section 159 of the Equality Act and the British prohibition against 
positive discrimination because it allows for a league club’s 
evaluation of each managerial candidate’s merit before obliging a 
league club to have to interview a racial minority managerial or 
executive candidate.295  It also provides for what would be an 
effective measure in helping to achieve racial equality at the 
managerial and executive levels of English professional soccer. 
While such a version of the Rooney Rule would have a less 
compulsive effect on league clubs than the NFL’s current version 
of the Rooney Rule, the rule’s positive impact on English 
professional soccer’s hiring practices still would likely be 
significant.  As discussed above, this is because even under the 
NFL’s current version of the Rooney Rule only those racial 
minority candidates who are qualified to fill head coaching or 
executive job vacancies typically get interviews.296  In essence, 
English professional soccer’s version of the Rooney Rule would be 
a mandate of this practice, and as the NFL’s case demonstrates, 
this practice has proven quite successful in remedying racially 
inequitable team hiring practices at both the head coaching and 
executive positions.297 
Furthermore, although candidate qualification is initially left to 
each soccer club’s own discretion, this is unlikely to create a 
loophole that clubs would or could exploit to avoid English 
professional soccer’s Rooney Rule mandate.  First, as was the case 
in the NFL, unconscious rather than conscious racial bias is likely 
the predominant cause of the racially discriminatory managerial 
and executive hiring practices that have developed in English 
professional soccer.298  As a result, clubs are unlikely to engage in 
intentional shirking of the proposed Rooney Rule mandate (for 
example, they will not intentionally conduct racial minority sham 
interviews to keep English professional soccer’s managerial and 
executive ranks white). 
 
 295 See Equality Act, 2010, Explanatory Notes, supra note 239. 
 296 See Associated Press, supra note 262 (noting how the NFL’s Pittsburgh Steelers 
conducted interviews in 2007 from a list of qualified candidates).  
 297 See Mann, supra note 25. 
 298 See Tobin, supra note 19. 
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Second, and of tantamount importance, the proposed rule 
forces white decision-makers to confront their own unconscious 
racial biases rather than allow them to make hiring decisions based 
on past practice and implicit racial predispositions that would 
otherwise circumvent the purpose of the proposed version of the 
Rooney Rule mandate.299  By subjecting all team managerial and 
executive hiring processes to League Chairman review and 
potentially stiff fines and public humiliation, the proposed version 
of the Rooney Rule forces such team decision-makers to abandon 
the status quo and engage in legitimate, racially diverse searches 
for managerial and executive candidates.300 
As is evident from the Rooney Rule’s nine-year existence in 
the NFL, league mandated racial minority interviews can help lead 
to dramatic improvement in the racial composition of team head 
coaching and management.301  While the NFL’s version of the 
Rooney Rule must be tweaked for English professional soccer to 
adopt it, these adjustments would have a negligible effect on the 
rule’s overall positive impact.302  Therefore, not only can English 
professional soccer implement a version of the Rooney Rule, but it 
can be employed in a way that helps bring about meaningful 
change in English professional soccer’s managerial and executive 
ranks. 
B. Strategic Business Implementation of the Rooney Rule in 
English Professional Soccer 
In addition to proposing a legally viable version of the Rooney 
Rule that maintains its bite, this proposed version of the Rooney 
Rule also takes into account English professional soccer’s business 
model and business needs. 
First, as was the case in the NFL, English professional soccer’s 
version of the Rooney Rule should be initially implemented only 
 
 299 See Collins, supra note 10, at 872. 
 300 See PROXMIRE, supra note 25, at 4 (describing the fines and public shaming that the 
NFL imposed on one team for failing to observe the Rooney Rule). 
 301 See Duru, The Fritz Pollard Alliance, supra note 27, at 197. 
 302 See supra notes 296–299 and accompanying text. 
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as a managerial hiring mandate.303  This will provide league clubs 
with an opportunity to adjust their hiring practices to the new rule 
and help minimize any potential club backlash against the rule’s 
implementation.304  Moreover, the NFL’s team owners only 
approved adoption of the Rooney Rule mandate for front office 
executive hiring after it was evident that the Rooney Rule mandate 
was an effective mechanism at achieving racial equality in NFL 
head coaching.305  The same rollout should be applied in English 
professional soccer, as league clubs will be more receptive to 
expanding the rule to executive hiring once there is some evidence 
that the mandate works in the coaching ranks. 
Second, this version of the Rooney Rule should originally be 
implemented in the Premier League and the Football League.  Not 
only is this where employment inequality is most noticeable in 
English professional soccer’s managerial and executive ranks, but 
as Cyrus Mehri explains, adopting such a rule in the Premier 
League and the Football League “shows leadership worldwide.”306 
By demonstrating leadership at the top of English professional 
soccer as it pertains to this issue, it will signify to all other 
professional soccer leagues, both in Britain and abroad, that it is 
time to fully tackle race discrimination and managerial and 
executive employment inequality in professional soccer. 
In addition to corporate social responsibility and its positive 
trickle-down effect on other professional soccer leagues, 
implementation of this version of the Rooney Rule at the elite 
levels of English professional soccer is also “good business.”307  
 
 303 See William C. Rhoden, Working With the N.F.L. on Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 
2009, at B10. 
 304 See Anderson, supra note 268 (explaining that the essential differences between 
English professional soccer and the NFL, such as how the leagues typically hire and fire, 
need to be taken into account before implementation). 
 305 See Rhoden, supra note 303 (noting it was the Rule’s success with management 
hiring that compelled the NFL to entend the rule to front office positions). 
 306 Mann, supra note 25.  See, e.g., Alistair Magowan, English Football not Ready for 
“Rooney Rule” for Black Managers, BBC SPORT (Aug. 3, 2012), available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/football/19418328 (noting that within the ninety-two 
football clubs, only three managers are black). 
 307 See Charles Guice, Why English Football Will Adopt the Rooney Rule, THE POLITICS 
OF FOOTBALL (Oct. 11, 2011), available at http://sites.duke.edu/wcwp/ 2011/10/11/why-
english-football-will-adopt-the-nfls-rooney-rule//. See generally DR. GEOFF WALTERS & 
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Because the Premier League and the Football League have become 
a combined £7.7 billion international enterprise that contributes 
substantially to the British economy, the two leagues must 
maintain their growing global appeal.308  Adopting this version of 
the Rooney Rule clearly aids in this goal as it demonstrates to the 
game’s expanding base of racially and ethnically diverse sponsors 
and fans a commitment to achieving workplace diversity.309 
Finally, this proposed version of the Rooney Rule in English 
professional soccer should be understood as a temporary 
measure.310  As previously discussed, even those that are in favor 
of the Rooney Rule’s continued use in the NFL believe that it will 
not be a permanent measure.311  Rather, the Rooney Rule should 
only be implemented for as long as it takes to attain racial equality 
in managerial and executive employment.312  While this is a 
potentially indefinite time period, the Rooney Rule is intended to 
be a proportionate remedy to employment discrimination.313  Once 
the employment discrimination is eradicated, so too is the need for 
the Rooney Rule. 
C. Avoiding Resistance to the Rooney Rule’s Implementation in 
English Professional Soccer 
While this proposed version of the Rooney Rule fits effectively 
within Britain’s positive action legal framework and English 
professional soccer’s business structure, it is important to highlight 
that the proposed version of the Rooney Rule is also crafted in a 
way that can avoid much of the anti-affirmative action and anti-
 
RICHARD TACON, BIRKBECK SPORT BUSINESS CENTER, CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY IN EUROPEAN FOOTBALL 7 (Apr. 2011) (describing corporate social 
responsibility as “responsibilities that a business has beyond profit maximization”). 
 308 Id. 
 309 See e.g., Daniela M. de la Piedra, Diversity Initiatives in the Workplace: The 
Importance of Furthering the Efforts of Title VII, 4 MOD. AM. 43, at *3 (2008) 
(explaining that clients and customers can also play a role in developing and enforcing 
diversity initiatives, which then helps the initiative achieve results). 
 310 See Bailey, supra note 292. 
 311 See, e.g., id. (noting that Rooney himself hopes the rule will not be needed for much 
longer). 
 312 Id. (explaining that the point of the Rooney Rule is “not to impose a draconian 
measure, but to change the thinking of those in power”). 
 313 Id.  
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Rooney Rule dialogue that has plagued the Rooney Rule’s 
existence in the United States.314  This is important because, as 
Professor Thomas Ross points out, such dialogue detracts from the 
larger discussion of how to continuously improve race relations not 
only in the workplace, but also in all aspects of society.315 
Unsurprisingly, initial calls for the Rooney Rule’s 
implementation in English professional soccer yielded unreceptive 
responses from some key white English professional soccer 
constituencies.  This is most notably evidenced by Premier League 
chief executive Richard Scudamore’s public dismissal of the 
Rooney Rule in November 2011.316 
As described above, comments like Scudamore’s are likely 
symptomatic of the larger problem of unconscious bias in English 
professional soccer.  However, they also highlight the impulsive 
negative reaction that many have had to the NFL’s version of the 
Rooney Rule. 
Because the NFL’s version of the Rooney Rule mandates an 
unconditional racial minority interview quota, it is often argued to 
be an incredibly burdensome and unfair affirmative action 
mandate.317  Yet in reality, compliance with the NFL’s version of 
the Rooney Rule barely requires any additional effort by a team 
employer, and as discussed above, it has proven highly effective 
since its inception in helping to combat unconscious bias and racial 
inequality in the NFL’s workplace.318  As Professor Ross explains, 
by getting stuck on this misguided debate about whether 
affirmative action plans such as the Rooney Rule are fair in the 
absence of a fuller picture of how racial privilege benefits the 
“innocent,” we miss the key point about whether the plan is 
actually effective in combating unconscious bias and whether it is 
ultimately helping to achieve improved race relations.319 
 
 314 See infra note 321 and accompanying text. 
 315 See Ross, supra note 152, at 315–16. 
 316 Richard Scudamore Rules Out Premier League “Rooney Rule” and 39th game, 
supra note 283. 
 317 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 179 (arguing that it is unfair to make NFL owners 
interview candidates that may not be qualified). 
 318 See Collins, supra note 10, at 912. 
 319 See Ross, supra note 152, at 315–16. 
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In this regard, the crucial utility of this Note’s proposed version 
of the Rooney Rule is that it does away with the NFL’s 
unconditional racial minority interview quota and puts an emphasis 
on each candidate’s merit before requiring a mandatory minority 
candidate interview.  By having the proposed mandate focus on 
candidate merit, it removes the ability to persuasively and 
obstructively argue that the Rooney Rule is unfair to teams and 
non-minority employment candidates, or that it often results in 
sham interviews.  This in turn puts the spotlight back on the real 
problem of addressing unconscious bias in the upper levels of 
English professional soccer’s workplace, which consequently 
would be a vital step in helping to achieve racial equality in 
English professional soccer’s managerial and executive ranks. 
Importantly, soccer clubs are also incentivized to interview a 
qualified racial minority managerial or executive candidate 
because such an individual could end up being the best available 
person to fill a soccer club’s managerial or executive vacancy.  
Thus, to mandate that English professional soccer clubs do this (as 
this proposed rule would) does little more than require an employer 
to engage in an employment practice that it should already be 
carrying out in the first place.  In other words, this proposed 
version of the Rooney Rule not only helps to address unconscious 
bias in the workplace, but from a business perspective it 
consequently helps clubs to obtain the most talented employees.  
This is something that every business organization strives for, and 
it would be a tenuous position at best to argue that this proposed 
version of the Rooney Rule, as opposed to the NFL’s version, 
would do more to hurt English professional soccer’s business 
model than it would to help it. 
As Rooney Rule co-creator Cyrus Mehri explained in a recent 
interview, English professional soccer can no longer sit idly by and 
allow unconscious racial bias to continue to affect its managerial 
and executive ranks.320  Any version of the Rooney Rule is going 
to have its flaws, but for world class businesses like the Premier 
League and the Football League to allow this problem to persist is 
simply unacceptable.  The proposed version of the Rooney Rule 
 
 320 See generally Mann, supra note 25. 
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addresses unconscious bias and the resultant unintentional 
discrimination in a way that even the most steadfast affirmative 
action opponents would have a difficult time credibly arguing is 
“unfair” or detrimental.  This in turn allows for a less contentious 
approach to tackling the unconscious racial biases that have 
permeated English professional soccer and consequently, for a 
more effective approach to combating unintentional discrimination 
against racial minority managerial and executive candidates. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that English professional 
soccer should adopt a version of the Rooney Rule. 
The Rooney Rule has its critics both in the United States and in 
Britain.321  As the Rooney Rule’s own co-creator Cyrus Mehri 
points out, the Rooney Rule “may not be perfect.”322  As this Note 
indicates, however, English professional soccer’s version of the 
Rooney Rule can be crafted in a way that avoids a lot of these ills. 
While the principles that underlie the Rooney Rule’s 
foundation may be controversial, without the implementation of a 
version of the Rooney Rule, unintentional discrimination will 
likely continue in English professional soccer as white team 
decision-makers will persist in relying on unconscious biases when 
hiring managerial and executive level employees.323  Indeed, the 
fact that the Rooney Rule has worked so well in helping to prevent 
unintentional discrimination in the NFL’s comparable employment 
setting is a testament to how effective a version of the Rooney 
Rule can be in English professional soccer. 
Given English professional soccer’s prominence, adoption of a 
version of the Rooney Rule would also be a significant step 
forward in helping to break down racial barriers in greater British 
 
 321 See, e.g., Richard Scudamore Rules Out Premier League “Rooney Rule” and 39th 
Game, supra note 283(stating “[i]f people are good enough, then they will get chances”); 
Duru, The Fritz Pollard Alliance, supra note 27, at 189 (noting most Americans’ aversion 
to recognize discrimination within organizations); Johnson, supra note 174 (arguing that 
forcing owners to interview ill-qualified candidates is a waste of time). 
 322 Mann, supra note 25. 
 323 Id. 
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society.324  As British Prime Minister David Cameron recently 
explained, English professional soccer has “a vital role to play” in 
the creation of social equality.325  As so many young people 
emulate what they see on the soccer field in their everyday 
activities, the implementation of a version of the Rooney Rule has 
the potential to help transform not only the composition of English 
professional soccer’s managerial and executive ranks, but also the 
composition of the entire British workforce’s.326 
In sum, it is time for English professional soccer to show that it 
is serious in its desire to eject racial discrimination from its clubs’ 
managerial and executive hiring practices.  English professional 
soccer’s adoption of the proposed version of the Rooney Rule 
would be a meaningful step toward achieving this goal, and 
therefore, it should be implemented immediately.  
 
 
 324 See Mann, supra note 25 (explaining how the Rooney Rule is about “opening up 
barriers”). 
 325 Cameron Hosts Anti-Racism Summit, supra note 5. 
 326 See id. 
